4 principle requiring that the punishable conduct must be described in sufficient detail to avoid this kind of confusion. The Court, however, did not reach this conclusion. Rather, it found that, even though both statutory crime definitions were vague enough to allow for one or the other to be applied to the same conduct, the crime definitions contained in Decree-Law No. 25.659 were unconstitutional, and not those set out in Decree-Law No. 24.575. 12. In relation to Article 2 of Decree-Law No. 24.575, the Constitutional Court held that it was not unconstitutional, stating that the requirement that the law should be certain may not be understood as a condition requiring that concepts be drafted in perfectly clear and precise language, and that Criminal Law admitted the existence of open-ended definitions of crimes that “delegate the task of supplementing them to the courts through statutory construction” (paragraph 49). The Court then proceeded to point out that Article 2 provides for three elements. a. In interpreting “the first element” formulated by the Constitutional Court as “frightening the population,” the Court held that it was inadmissible to interpret such element without considering the general principle laid down in Article 12 of the Criminal Code, which provides that there is no punishment without criminal intent or negligence. Consequently, the Court found that the omission of this requirement in Article 2 was not sufficient to hold it unconstitutional since it must be regarded as incorporated into said provision. The Court adds that “[o]nly the implied rule could be held unconstitutional” (emphasis added), that is, the interpretative meaning that derives from the referred omission insofar as “provision” (the formulation of a legal precept) and “rule” (the interpretative meaning or meanings that may be derived from such formulation) are not the same. As a result, the Court resolved that: “courts may not convict a person, under Article 2 of Decree-Law No. 24.575, for the mere fact that the legal interests specified therein have been damaged or put at risk, without taking into consideration his culpability” (paragraph 63), adding that Article 2 may only be applicable where the infringement of such legal interests “has been committed purposely;” therefore, this article should be read as if the word “intentionally” were written before the verbs causes, creates or maintains. b. In examining the second element, “acts against property or services,” the Court proceeded to clarify some issues, for instance, that where Article 2 specifies “against the safety of … any means of communication or transport” “its scope” must “be limited to the types of conduct that constitute the crime against public safety involving means of transport or communication” (paragraph 72) and that the expression “against the safety of … any other property or services,” must be interpreted “as referring only to property or services specifically protected by criminal statutes through the different definitions of crimes against public safety involving means of transport or communication” (paragraph 73). This certainly restricted the scope of application of the provision, which would now encompass fewer acts likely to be considered as falling within the definition of criminal offense. In its analysis of the third element, the examination of the means described, the Court defined what must be understood by “weapons” and “any other means” as used in Article 2. 13. The Constitutional Court concluded that the language of Article 2 is vague “in relation to the need to specify the scope of the word ‘acts’,” which, for the purpose of giving a more accurate conceptual definition, must be understood as illicit acts (paragraph 77), stating that in addition to the requirement of intent, the three