13 37. Effectively, the judicial protection (Article 25) and judicial guarantees (Article 8) conceptually form an organic whole and make up the rule of law in a democratic society. The effective recourses before the national competent judicial courts (the habeas corpus, the amparo in the majority of Latin American countries, the mandado de segurança in Brazil, among others, all of them in the sense of Article 25 of the American Convention) must be exercised within the framework and pursuant to the principles of the due process of law (enshrined in Article 8 of the Convention). 27 38. It may occur that, in a specific case, there could be a violation of only one of the constitutive elements of that whole of protection and judicial guarantees, - but this does not diminish at all the integrative hermeneutics I have stated, in the sense that, in principle, that stated in Articles 8 and 25 of the American Convention must necessarily be taken as a whole, - which make up, I insist, the rule of law of a democratic society, - in relation with the general duties established in Articles 1(1) and 2 of the Convention. Any affirmation to the contrary would require, in my opinion, a justification that, from where I stand, simply does not exist, and would not be at all convincing. A violation to the right to access justice (Article 25) would in all probability contaminate the guarantees of the due process of law (Article 8). 39. The international organizations that supervise human rights, without setting aside the precepts of the general rule for the interpretation of treaties (Article 31(1) of both Conventions of Vienna on Rights of the Treaties, 1969 and 1986), have developed a teleological interpretation, with emphasis on the realization of the object and purpose of the treaties on human rights, as the most appropriate to ensure an effective protection of said rights. At the end, subjacent to the mentioned general rule of interpretation stipulated in both Conventions of Vienna (Article 31(1)), is the principle, amply supported in the jurisprudence, according to which the conventional stipulations must be ensured their own effects (the so-called effet utile). This principle – ut res magis valeat quam pereat, - through which the interpretation must favor a treaty’s appropriate effects assumed, in matters of human rights, special importance in the determination of the ample scope of the conventional obligations of protection.28 40. Said interpretation is, in effect, the one that most faithfully reflects the special nature of the human rights treaties, the objective nature of the obligations included in them, and the autonomous sense of the concepts enshrined in them (different to the corresponding concepts in the framework of the domestic legal systems). Since the human rights treaties include concepts with an autonomous sense, product of a jurisprudential evolution, and since the object and purpose of the human rights treaties is different to those of the classic treaties (since they refer to the relationship between the State and the people under its jurisdiction); the classical postulates of interpretation of the treaties in general adjust to this new reality.29 27 Cf., in that sense, the ninth Advisory Opinion of the IACourtHR, on the Judicial Guarantees in States of Emergency (1987). 28 29 A.A. Cançado Trindade, Tratado..., volume II, op. cit. supra n. (11), pp. 32-33 and 192. Ibid., pp. 32-34; and cf. also R. Bernhardt, "Thoughts on the Interpretation of Human Rights Treaties", in Protecting Human Rights: The European Dimension - Studies in Honour of G.J. Wiarda (eds. F. Matscher y H. Petzold), Köln, C. Heymanns, 1988, pp. 66-67 y 70;71; Erik Suy, "Droit des traités et droits de l'homme", in Völkerrecht als Rechtsordnung Internationale Gerichtsbarkeit Menschenrechte - Festschrift für H. Mosler (eds. R. Bernhardt et alii), Berlin, Springer-Verlag, 1983, pp. 935-947; J. Velu y R. Ergec, La Convention européenne des droits de l'homme, Bruxelles, Bruylant, 1990, p. 51.