78 248. In this case, the Court notes that I.V. had access to the Bolivian State’s public health care services (supra paras. 62 and 63), even though the health care provided disregarded the elements of accessibility and acceptability (supra paras. 156 and 164). Despite this, the facts of this case do not reveal that the decision to perform the tubal ligation on I.V. was based on her nationality of origin, her situation as a refugee, or her socio-economic status. Nevertheless, the Court considers that these aspects had an impact on the magnitude of the harm suffered by I.V. in the sphere of her personal integrity. And this is notwithstanding what the Court establishes below in relation to the search to obtain justice (infra paras. 318 to 321). 249. Based on the above, the Court concludes that the State incurred international responsibility owing to the discrimination experienced by I.V., on the basis of her condition as a woman, with regard to the enjoyment and exercise of the rights established in Articles 5(1), 7(1), 11(1), 11(2), 13(1) and 17(2) of the Convention. B.3.d The right of women to a life free from violence (Article 7(a) of the Convention of Belém do Pará) 250. In the inter-American sphere, the Inter-American Convention for the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence against Women “Convention of Belém do Pará” establishes the right of every woman to be free from violence, and that this right includes the right to be free of all forms of discrimination.328 In addition, it indicates that States must “refrain from engaging in any act or practice of violence against women and […] ensure that their authorities, officials, personnel, agents, and institutions act in conformity with this obligation.”329 In this regard, the Court recalls that the protection of human rights is based on affirming the existence of certain sacrosanct attributes of the human being that cannot be legitimately impaired by the exercise of public powers. These are individual spheres that the State may not violate.330 In order to ensure this protection, the Court has considered that it is not sufficient for States to refrain from violating rights; rather, it is imperative that they adopt positive measures, determined in function of the specific needs for protection of the subjects of law, due either to their personal condition or to the specific situation in which they finds themselves.331 The Court considers that this State obligation acquires special relevance when violations of the sexual and reproductive rights of women are involved, as in the case of nonconsensual sterilizations performed in public hospitals. 251. The Convention of Belém do Pará has established parameters to identify when an act constitutes violence and its Article 1 defines this as follows: ”violence against women shall be understood as any act or conduct, based on gender, which causes death or physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women, whether in the public or the private sphere.”332 In addition, the Court has indicated that gender-based violence “includes acts that inflict physical, mental or sexual harm or suffering, threats of such acts, coercion, and other deprivations of liberty.”333 Cf. Case of González et al. (“Cotton Field”) v. Mexico, supra, para. 394, and Case of Velásquez Paiz et al. v. Guatemala, supra, para. 175, both citing the Convention of Belém do Pará, Preamble and Article 6. 328 329 Convention of Belém do Pará, Article 7(a). Cf. The Word "Law" in Article 30 of the American Convention on Human Rights. Advisory Opinion OC-6/86, supra, para. 21, and Case of Castillo Petruzzi et al. v. Peru. Merits reparations and costs. Judgment of May 30, 1999. Series C No. 52, para. 120. 330 Cf. Case of the Pueblo Bello Massacre v. Colombia, supra, para. 111, and Case of Chinchilla Sandoval v. Guatemala, supra, para. 168. 331 332 Convention of Belém do Pará, Article 1. Case of the Miguel Castro Castro Prison v. Peru. Merits reparations and costs. Judgment of November 25, 2006. Series C No. 160, para. 303, and Case of Espinoza Gonzáles v. Peru, supra, para. 223, both citing UN, Committee for the Elimination 333