rights and in which it is ordered that specific measures or structural reforms be adopted, but rather it is necessary that these decisions be carried out and produce the effects established by law.287 242. The Commission observes that deprivation of liberty is an exceptional measure in a criminal proceeding. Accordingly, the delay of almost five months in carry out a habeas corpus ruling that is favorable and self-executing not only violates the right to the review and enforcement of judicial rulings, but implies that the detention itself ceases to have a legal foundation and so becomes arbitrary. Ms. Andrade, even having secured a decision from the Constitutional Court on August 31, 2000, that ordered her release on bail, was released in early February 2001, after a complex process that was not expeditious. 243. The Commission observes that the series of appeals that was necessary for the release of Ms. Andrade Salmón reflects that she did not have a simple and effective remedy to protect her right to personal liberty. 244. Therefore, the Commission concludes, based on its consideration of the evidence produced by the parties in the record of the Gader case, that Ms. Andrade Salmón’s right to a simple and effective remedy to protect her fundamental rights in the terms of Articles 7(6) and 25 of the American Convention was violated, and therefore, her right to personal liberty enshrined in Article 7(1) of the same instrument, in relation to the duty to respect and ensure enshrined in Article 1(1), since the judgments of the Constitutional Court on habeas corpus of August 31, 2000, and January 16, 2001, were not effective. b) Street Lamps 245. In relation to the criminal proceeding in the Street Lamps case, which was conducted independent of the Gader proceeding, it appears in the facts proven that on October 17, 2000, the Ninth Criminal Examining Judge issued a pre-trial detention order against Ms. Andrade, which she appealed on October 18, 2000, and it was granted and remanded for procedural defects in the processing of the appeal. The Commission also notes, according to the facts proven, that Ms Andrade filed a writ of habeas corpus on October 25, 2000, which was rejected on October 27, 2000. Ms. Andrade, who was deprived of liberty as of August 3, 2000, in at the women’s facility known as Centro de Orientación Femenina as a result of the Gader proceeding, was transferred on October 27, 2000, to the prison known as the Penitenciaría Distrital at Obrajes. 246. Subsequently, on October 31, 2000, Ms. Andrade appealed to the Constitutional Court the ruling that dismissed her writ of habeas corpus, based on the alleged improper and unlawful persecution she was suffering; the impact on the merits of the procedural defects in the processing of the writ by the staff of the court, since eight days after having filed the writ the record had not been forwarded to the Superior Court, as the signatures were being cured (the law established a term of 24 hours for doing so); and the absence of any danger of flight or information that would indicate that Ms. Andrade Salmón could obstruct the effort to find the truth. It appears in the facts proven that before the resolution of this writ, on November 10, 2000, the Superior District Court resolved the appeal of the pre-trial detention order that had been filed on October 18, 2000, ordering the cessation of the pre-trial detention and the adoption of a series of precautionary measures, among them the imposition of a bail of 100,000 bolivianos, which were deposited by Ms. Andrade on November 27, 2000. 247. The Commission notes that according to the facts proven on December 11, 2000, the Constitutional Court ruled favorably on the writ of habeas corpus flied on October 31, 2000, on considering that the judge whose decision was appealed had committed an illegal act on ordering the pre-trial detention of Ms. Andrade without the requirements of Article 233 of the Code of Criminal Procedure being present simultaneously (existence of indications of the guilt of the accused and danger of flight or obstruction of justice). It also appears in the facts proven that once the order for Ms. Andrade not to leave the court’s 287 249. IACHR, Report on the Human Rights of Persons Deprived of Liberty in the Americas, OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc 64, December 31, 2011, para.