5 14. In order to answer to these questions, I believe it is essential to accept a rule and to dismiss the temptation. The rule that I accept is the following: the rights violated by certain facts described in the set of human rights rules are precisely those contained in such description, not others, so long as this is not modified. It seems patently obvious. Perhaps it is. But it cannot be spontaneously and easily admitted, or its consequences accepted, for that reason. The temptation that needs to be dismissed is that: to combine in the precept all the rights, all the liberties that we may have with certain effort of our imagination, skill or will, under the belief that suffice it to say that there is a violation of right in order for such violation to exist or that such combination implies more condemnation and better prevention, and that for this reason, it frees the interpreter from restricting to the nature and limits of the precept it applies. 15. The forced disappearance affects the liberty of the victim and the possibility of having access to justice. These are the main, remarkably rights that the disappearance violates. The descriptions contained in the international treaties follow that direction, in a precise and clear manner. If we were- but we are not, though the analogy helpsestablishing the classification of crimes committed by means of a certain fact that affects legal interests subjected to criminal protection, we surely would conclude that there are crimes against liberty and crimes against justice (under the expressions that may correspond according to the technique used to classify by the respective codes). We could also say, going beyond the precise regulatory description of the facts, that the disappearance entails an infringement of the mental integrity of the victim, given that it causes to the victim- we have to presume it, but it is perfectly reasonable to assume- anguish, pain, fear, suffering, which are the relevant features of the violation of the mental integrity. This conclusion does not go beyond the facts of the disappearance, but naturally derives from them. 16. Up to here what is evident, and perhaps very evident, to put forward, with soundness and competence, the most firm condemnation and the most efficient prevention and prosecution of forced disappearance. I would use another reference, just by way of example: The condemnation that we address against abduction (and I highlight- do not misinterpret- that it is no way my intention to dissolve the disappearance in the abduction: both precepts have been differentiated for a while, distinction that I emphasize) and the direct and effective fight that the State must start against such serious criminal behavior, do not require us to say, in addition, that