56 217. The State also clarified that full and permanent disqualification, as a measure of punishment, is not a precautionary measure, but a sanction under the Argentine Criminal Code. It stated, therefore, that “[the Code of Military Justice], currently repealed, did not provide for a sentence of disqualification. The order for this sanction now brought before the Court is the consequence of the application of article 510 of the former [Code of Military Justice], under which the general provisions of the Argentine Criminal Code were applicable to military criminal proceedings.” 218. The State added, “[d]isqualification is a removal of rights that could be either permanent or temporary and, depending on the particular rights it affects, may be either full or specific […]. In the case of the applicants, the criminal sanction as ordered was full disqualification according to the scope defined in article 19 of the Argentine Criminal Code. The descriptive word “full” is part of the technical nomenclature in the legislation and is not the equivalent of “civic death.” Regarding the duration of the sentence, full and permanent disqualification “[i]n no sense whatsoever […] means eternal.” 219. Moreover, the law provides the remedy of reinstatement to restore the use and enjoyment of the rights and capacities that were stripped from the person sentenced to disqualification, “a remedy that does not entail returning to the same position from which the person was removed, or retaking the responsibilities or guardianship that were terminated.” Under the terms of article 20-ter of the Argentine Criminal Code, certain conditions must be in place for reinstatement to be ordered after full disqualification – the passage of 10 years and, “to the degree possible,” having made restitution for the damage.” 202 The State affirmed, in this sense, that the current restriction on the victims’ rights was a consequence of the applicants’ failure to take any further action, as to date they had not requested reinstatement. 220. He concluded that the material content governed by article 23 did not include the right to conduct business or the right to apply for commercial credit. Finally, he commented, “[a]lthough the representatives are patently refraining from identifying exactly what damage was caused […], it can be assumed that their harm had to do with the inability to exercise the right to vote and be elected and to have access to public service. These grievances were not alleged by the applicants, and the State of Argentina therefore is under no compulsion to comment on them. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the restriction placed upon them under the application of the criminal sanction known as full and permanent disqualification […] entailed no stripping of their political rights, but rather a legitimate restriction thereof in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 2 [of article 23].” For these reasons, they asked the Court to find no violation of article 23 of the American Convention. B. Considerations of the Court 221. The Court has already said that article 23 of the Convention recognizes citizen rights exercised individually. Paragraph 1 of the article attributes the following rights to all persons: (a) to take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives; (b) to vote and to be elected in genuine periodic elections, which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and by secret ballot that guarantees the free expression of the 202 Criminal Code (Law 11.179, December 21, 1984): Article 20-ter.: Persons sentenced to full disqualification may be reinstated to the use and enjoyment of the rights and capacities taken from them if they have conducted themselves properly for half of the term ordered for disqualification, or ten years in the case of a life sentence, and have made restitution of the damage as much as possible. […] If the disqualification meant loss of a public position or a role of responsibility or guardianship, restitution shall not include being restored to the same positions. For all relevant purposes, the term ordered for disqualification shall not include the affected person’s time as a fugitive or while being held in detention or custody.