17 expressly and formally recognized their international responsibility.44 A friendly settlement procedure requires participation and decision by all parties to the case. The Commission may extend its good offices to help the parties talk to each other, but the outcome is out of its hands. 56. Any party interested in a friendly settlement may propose it. In view of the purpose and objective of the Convention, which is to defend human rights protected in the text, the State’s participation in such a process cannot be understood as a recognition of responsibility, but instead, as a good-faith gesture to uphold the purposes of the Convention. 45 The same is true for measures adopted to implement recommendations by the Inter-American Commission. 57. The other question is the argument that the State admitted responsibility in the domestic jurisdiction when it submitted the draft reform of the Code of Military Justice to the national congress in 2007, and the reform was enacted the following year; this cannot be held to have triggered effects in international law, as this was not the intention or objective of the measure. The State made clear reference to the fact that it had been challenged before the inter-American system in the Argüelles case and another case, as one of the reasons to pursue reform of the Military Code of Justice. 46 A simple reading of the text sent to congress by the minister of defense leaves no doubt that this is true. The Court would also note that an acquiescence can be held as valid only if it is a clear expression of the State’s will.47 This was not the case here. 58. As a consequence, the Court reaffirms that the State has not changed its position regarding the human rights violations alleged in the instant case, and it has expressed its objections from the very beginning of the proceedings before the Inter-American Court. In conclusion, the principle of estoppel 48 does not apply in this case. VI. EVIDENCE A. Documentary and expert evidence 59. The Court received a number of documents submitted as evidence by the Commission, the representatives and the State, attached to their primary briefs (supra par. 1, 6, 8 and 44 Cfr., among others, Case of Barrios Altos v. Perú. Merits. Judgment of March 14, 2001. Series C No. 75, par. 31; Case of Pacheco Teruel et al. v. Honduras. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of April 27, 2012. Series C No. 241, par. 15; Case of García Cruz and Sánchez Silvestre v. Mexico. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 26, 2013. Series C No. 273, par. 12. 45 Case of Caballero Delgado v. Colombia. Preliminary objections, par. 30. 46 Cfr. Evidence file, folio 4. Law 26.394 was enacted on August 26, 2008, repealing the Military Code of Justice and all its internal implementing rules, resolutions and provisions, and amending the Argentine Criminal Code and Criminal Procedural Code. The new body of laws created a new military justice system. 47 Cfr. Case of Contreras et al. v. El Salvador. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of August 31, 2011. Series C No. 232, par. 16. 48 The Court has held in its case law that a State, having taken a particular stance that triggers legal effects, cannot later invoke the principle of estoppel and assume some other position that contradicts its original line and alters the state of matters on which the other party had built its position. The estoppel principle has been recognized and applied in general international law and in international human rights law. See, in this regard, the Case of Neira Alegría et al. v. Peru. Preliminary Objections. Judgment of December 11, 1991. Series C No. 13, par. 29, Case of the Río Negro Massacres v. Guatemala, par. 25, and Case of Santo Domingo v. Colombia. Preliminary Objections, Merits and Reparations. Judgment of November 30, 2012. Series C No. 259, par. 15. 148.