2 6. In relation to Article 25, it should be noted that, in its Advisory Opinion OC9/87 (“Judicial Guarantees in States of Emergency,” para. 27), the Court stated that: “in the Spanish text of the Convention, the title of this provision (Article 8(1) of the Convention), whose interpretation has been specifically requested, is "Judicial Guarantees." 1 This title may lead to confusion because, strictly speaking, the provision does not recognize any judicial guarantees. Article 8 does not contain a specific judicial remedy, but rather the procedural requirements that should be observed in order to be able to speak of effective and appropriate judicial guarantees under the Convention.” Article 25 of the Convention is entitled “Judicial Protection” and establishes the right to a simple and prompt recourse before a competent court or tribunal and, later describes the State’s undertaking “to develop the possibility of judicial remedy.” These two provisions have been interpreted as if they established the remedy of amparo as obligatory in all cases, but this is not so. 7. Nicaraguan electoral legislation establishes a series of remedies against lesser electoral officials, which, in some cases, can reach the Supreme Electoral Council, but it expressly excludes the remedy of amparo in relation to electoral issues, as do the laws of many other countries. Also, many other countries, like Nicaragua, exclude judicial decisions from the remedy of amparo because they consider that ordinary recourses are sufficient to guarantee human rights. In the instant case, when the Supreme Electoral Council ruled on YATAMA’s request for the registration of its candidates, it was not exercising a simple administrative function, but was acting as a judicial tribunal on electoral matters and, consequently, the remedy of amparo which YATAMA applied for before officials of the Judiciary was inadmissible against this decision. As the grounds for this legal provision, it should be recalled that the high level of partisan politicization that exists in many countries makes it preferable not to politicize the Judiciary; and this would inevitably happen if it was entrusted with electoral matters. Thus, both because this was a jurisdictional decision and because it dealt with an electoral issue, the remedy of amparo was inadmissible. 8. Since this case refers to permitted regulations, it is outside the Court’s competence to examine the Supreme Electoral Council’s resolution to determine whether it was issued in correct application of the Nicaraguan electoral laws. This would be equivalent to converting the Court into a higher court of appeal than all the national courts, distancing it from its functions of interpretation and application of the provisions of the Convention. Moreover, the Court cannot consider Nicaraguan laws in the absence of any evidence that they are contrary to human rights and bearing in mind that, under the same laws, YATAMA took part in the 2004 local elections without any problem. 9. To conclude I would like to put on record the reasons for my dissent on the points relating to the publication of this judgment, the reform of the law, and the adoption of other measures, because, as I said in paragraph 14 of my opinion in the Serrano Cruz Sisters v. El Salvador, judgment of March 1, 2005, Article 63 of the Convention does not entrust the Court with promoting human rights and the points cited constitute promotion rather than reparation for the victims. 10. The contents of the preceding paragraph should not be interpreted to mean that I consider that Nicaraguan laws are perfect as regards the treatment of the indigenous peoples who inhabit the Atlantic Coast. The Government of Nicaragua, 1 “Right to a Fair Trial" in the English text