7 maintains that those facts are unrelated to the case at hand and that it is a false claim that the Peruvian State has never clarified. 34. The petitioner claims that the Peruvian State violated Mr. Galindo’s right to personal liberty, in that he was arrested absent a prior court order and without being caught in flagrante delicto, as required by Article 24.2.f of the Constitution. He alleges that he was never formally advised of the charges against him, that he was not informed of the reasons for his detention, nor was he given any record of his detention or release. He contends that the period of his unlawful detention exceeded all legal limits, including those provided for crimes of terrorism. He adds that he was held in a detention center that was not authorized by the law. 35. In addition, the petitioner claims that the investigation brought against Mr. Galindo violated the principle of a person’s right to be tried by a natural, independent, and impartial judge, in that given his status as a serving judge, a superior criminal prosecutor should have been involved in the investigation and not a provincial criminal prosecutor, who was placed lower than him in the hierarchy and, under Article 191 of the Organic Law of 2 the Judiciary, lacked jurisdiction. 36. Finally, he alleges that the case entails a violation of Article 9 of the Convention, since the characterization of the crime of terrorism in Decree Law No. 25475, pursuant to which the investigation against Mr. Galindo was conducted, is the basis of the characterization established in Decree Law No. 25659, which has been called into question by the Inter-American Court as violating the principle of legality. 37. The petitioner consequently requests: (1) a public apology for Mr. Galindo Cárdenas, through the same channels that offended him; (2) the annulment of the resolutions of the provincial and superior prosecutors of Huánuco, which assigned the alleged victim a legal and criminal status that he never requested and never accepted and were based on false, contradictory, and ambiguous facts; (3) economic compensation and/or redress for the serious material and moral damages caused, which have affected his family life; and (4) guarantees and assurances for his physical and emotional integrity in light of the repentant terrorist status imposed on him by State, which has placed his physical integrity in permanent danger. B.Position of the State 38. The State for its part argues that the petitioner was detained in order to establish his criminal responsibility for the crime of terrorism, since a person covered by the repentance regime had pointed him out as a member of an organization with links to Sendero Luminoso. The State indicates that a statement of this type constitutes sufficient reason to justify a preliminary investigation and provisional detention, particularly in the context of a state of emergency. The State notes that following the accusation that Mr. Galindo had ties to the Shining Path terrorist organization and in accordance with Decree Law No. 25475, the specialized police unit was required to proceed with the corresponding investigation, as a result of which the alleged victim was taken into custody. The State maintains that Decree Law No. 25475, which regulates the crime of terrorism and sets specific rules for police investigations of such crimes, is a body of law that is in force and is applied in investigations and prosecutions for terrorism crimes. It notes that the constitutionality of that legislation has been upheld by the judgment of the Constitutional Court in case No. 010-2002-AI/TC and that under Decree Law 25475 and the Constitution itself, exceptional regimes exist for the arrest of individuals on suspicion of terrorist crimes. 39. The State adds that the petitioner’s arrest was governed by the norms laid down in Law No. 24150 and in Decree Law No. 749, which govern police action in zones where states of emergency have been declared, as well as by the provisions contained in the legislation on national pacification. 2 The petitioners cite Article 191 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch: “Arrest of Judges. Judges who are members of the judicial career may only be arrested under an order from a competent judge, or in delicto flagrante in those cases permitted by law. In the latter situation, the arrested judge must be taken immediately to the office of the competent prosecutor, after notice is served on the president of the corresponding court, using the swiftest channel and under liability.”