37 Reconciliation Commission also points out that emergency legislation led to a mentality in which measures to 124 restrict a suspect’s liberty were routine tools of criminal policy. 161. In the instant case, the petitioner alleges that when the State deprived Mr. Galindo of his liberty on October 16, 1994, it violated his right to personal liberty, as he was detained without a prior court order and was not caught in flagrante, as required under Article 2(24)(f) of the Constitution, and his special status as a Magistrate on Huánuco’s Superior Court was ignored. 162. The State, for its part, contends that the petitioner was taken into custody in order to establish his criminal responsibility for the crime of terrorism, since a person taking advantage of the repentance regime had informed on him and named him as being a member of an organization with ties to the Sendero Luminoso. The State argues that a declaration of this type is sufficient grounds to justify a preliminary investigation and detention on remand, especially when one considers that the scene of these events was under a state of emergency; the state of emergency meant that the petitioner’s detention was done pursuant to the provisions of Law 24150 and Decree Law No. 749, which dictate police business in areas declared under a state of emergency, and the provisions contained in the National Pacification Legislation (Decree Law 24475, governing the crime of terrorism). 163. The Commission observes that from the facts established in this case, the State has not submitted any evidence indicating that a repentant terrorist accused Mr. Galindo of being a member of the Sendero Luminoso. The Commission has taken as fact that it was Mr. Galindo who, of his own free will, went to the Yánac Military Base at the request of the Head of the Military-Political Command who under the emergency legislation in effect at the time, performed all government functions at every level and everywhere in the zone. Under that emergency legislation, the functions and authorities of civilian officials were subordinate to the authority of the Head of the Military-Political Command. The Commission has also taken as fact that Mr. Galindo was held in detention at the Yánac Military Base for 31 days, despite the fact that under Decree Law 25475, 15 days was the maximum a person could be held in detention on remand and, under its Article 12(a) the person was to be in the custody of the Peruvian National Police. 164. The Commission also observes that at the time of the events Mr. Galindo Cárdenas was serving as a Provisional Magistrate on the Huánuco Superior Court; hence, under Article 191 of the Organic Law of the Judiciary in force at that time, he could only be detained by court order or if caught in flagrante. If caught in flagrante, once the respective court was notified the magistrate should have been taken directly to the Public 125 Prosecutor’s Office via the most rapid route and under the responsibility of the arresting authority. 165. The Commission notes also that it is uncontested fact that the Provincial Prosecutor had knowledge of Mr. Galindo’s detention from the outset. However, the State has not provided any evidence indicating that once Mr. Galindo was taken into custody, the Huánuco Superior Court was advised of his detention. The Commission has taken as proven fact that although the Huánuco Superior Court, in the person of its President, sent a number of memoranda to the Head of the Military-Political Command and to Huánuco’s Chief Superior Prosecutor to obtain information on the legal situation of Magistrate Galindo, that information was not provided. Moreover, the President of the Supreme Court was not allowed to communicate with Magistrate Galindo in any way. 166. The Commission has already made reference to the powers given to the police under Law 25475, under which they are not subject to judicial review; also, the procedures that the law authorizes the police to use 124 Final Report of Peru’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission, VOLUME VI, Section four: crimes and human rights violations, Chapter 1: Patterns in the perpetration of crimes and human rights violations, 1.6 Violation of Due Process, 1.6.1. ANALYSIS OF THE LAW ON SUPPRESSION OF THE CRIME OF TERRORISM IN PERU, p. 386. 125 Article 191 of the Organic Law of the Judiciary, June 3, 1993 – Detention of Magistrates: Magistrates protected by the judicial career service may only be detained by order of a competent judge or in flagrante delicto where the law so requires. If a magistrate is caught in flagrante, he or she is to be taken immediately to the Prosecutor’s Office with jurisdiction, with the knowledge of the President of the respective court, by the most rapid route and under the responsibility of the arresting officer.