40 175. The Commission notes that Article 12(f) of Decree Law 25,745 on terrorism provides that “persons being prosecuted have a right to appoint their defense counsel, who may only intervene from the point at which the detainee makes his statement in the presence of a representative from the Public Prosecutor’s Office. If he does not appoint his legal counsel, the police authority shall designate a defense attorney ex officio, who shall be provided by the Ministry of Justice.” Based on the facts established in this case, the Declaration given by Mr. Galindo on October 15, 1994 indicates that no defense counsel was present; furthermore, during her visit with Mr. Galindo at the Yanac Military Base, the Attorney General of the Nation learned that Mr. Galindo was not represented by counsel, and no such counsel had been either appointed or offered for that purpose. Specifically, based on the facts established, the Commission notes that when the Attorney General asked Mr. Galindo if he was represented by counsel, Mr. Galindo answered that he did not think it advisable, inasmuch as he was himself an attorney and the case had been magnified out of proportion. The foregoing notwithstanding, the Commission finds no record of Mr. Galindo having formally waived his right to be represented by an attorney. 176. Given that Mr. Galindo was not informed of the reasons for his detention or of the charges he was allegedly facing, at the time of his conversation with the Attorney General he could hardly have been aware of just how serious the charges against him could be. The Commission believes that the law was very clear in establishing that if a detainee did not appoint a defense counsel, the police authority had a responsibility to assign one ex officio; the Attorney General of the Nation did not do what the law required of her, which was to order that his statement be taken again, this time in the presence of an attorney. 177. With specific reference to the guarantee protected in Article 8(2)(b) of the American Convention, the Court has written that to be in compliance with that provision, the State must notify the accused not only of the charges against him, that is, the crimes or offenses he is charged with, but also of the reasons for them, and the evidence for such charges and the legal definition of the facts. The defendant has the right to know, through a clear, detailed and precise description, all the information of the facts in order to fully exercise his right to defense and prove to the judge his version of the facts. The Court has considered that timely compliance with Article 8(2)(b) is essential for the effective 136 exercise of the right to defense. 178. The Commission also observes that the right to have time and means to prepare one’s defense, protected under Article 8(2)(c) of the Convention, also includes observance of the principle of rebuttal, thereby 137 guaranteeing that the defendant will have an opportunity to examine the evidence against him. The petitioner has consistently claimed that he never asked to avail himself of the Repentance Law. The Commission notes that the procedure applied to Mr. Galindo (the Repentance Law) meant that once a person announced that he wanted to avail himself of the benefits of that law, he had to make a statement before the competent authority and the prosecutor was to refer that statement to the specialized unit of the National Police, which was to verify whether what the applicant had stated was true. “The technical and scientific elements had to be duly substantiated to enable the Public Prosecutor’s Office or the Judicial Authority to decide whether the applicant had met the conditions to qualify for the benefit applied for.” In those cases in which there was no criminal case prosecuted, as happened in the instant case, the Prosecution’s decision as to whether the applicant qualified for the benefit had to be based on a report prepared by the Specialized Unit of the Police. Here, the Commission notes that the procedure established in this law did not give the accused an opportunity to refute or rebut the evidence obtained and presented by the Police; it was up to the Prosecutor to decide whether to exempt the applicant from 136 I/A Court H.R., Case of Barreto Leiva v. Venezuela. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 17, 2009. Series C No. 206. Paragraph 28. Citing: Cfr. Case of López Álvarez v. Honduras. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of February 1, 2006. Series C No. 141, paragraph 149; Case of Palamara Iribarne v. Chile. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 22, 2005. Series C No. 135, paragraph 225; Case of Acosta Calderón v. Ecuador. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of June 24, 2005. Series C No. 129, paragraph 118, and Case of Tibi v. Ecuador. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of September 7, 2004. Series C No. 114, paragraph 187. 137 I/A Court H.R., Case of Barreto Leiva v. Venezuela. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 17, 2009. Series C No. 206. Paragraph 54.