5 2. Compliance with these requirements is not incompatible with the necessary efficiency to combat subversive activities, insofar as it is the only way to direct the criminal system towards a rational system which is fundamentally intended to convict the guilty and acquit the innocent. 4 VIII. The human rights community has also stated in this regard that: “The decision rendered by the Constitutional Court on January 3, 2003, holding the Decree-Laws enacted during the authoritarian regime which seized power on April 5, 1992 unconstitutional -in part-, marks the beginning of a democratic criminal model and has been the most crucial element in the process of amending anti-terrorist legislation.” 5 IX. Furthermore, I believe it is essential to make mention of the interpretative criteria set by the Permanent Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice of Peru (Sala Permanente Penal de la Corte Suprema de la República) through its case law -to which I shall refer later in this opinionas well as to the statements made, in his expert capacity, by the Peruvian attorney, Carlos Martín Rivera-Paz, -in the Case of De la Cruz-Flores, which was recently heard by this Court- whose testimony was admitted in the instant case as evidence to facilitate the adjudication of the case. Said expert stated that, in relation to his analysis of competent judges and of the assessment of evidence made by such judges in the conditions now prevailing in Peru, there has been a significant change in recent proceedings (such as the one that resulted in Mr. García-Asto’s acquittal and the one that is still pending against Mr. Ramírez-Rojas) if compared with the proceedings previously conducted by “faceless” judges, which were quashed by the Constitutional Court. I concur with the majority of the Court in relation to the respect of the law in force for the nullum crimen nulla poena sine lege praevia principle embodied in Article 9 of the American Convention X. Thus, it seems logical to conclude -as the majority of the judges of this Court have- that the basic definition of the crime of terrorism as set out in Article 2 of the aforesaid Decree-Law, in light of the decision rendered by the Constitutional Court on January 3, 2003, does not violate the nullum crimen nulla poena sine lege praevia principle of criminal law contained in Article 9 of the American Convention. The Court holds this same criterion, with which I concur, with respect to Articles 319 and 320 of the Criminal Code of 1991, terrorism and aggravated terrorism, with the caveat noted 4 5 OMBUDSMAN’S OFFICE, Report No. 71, pp. 12 – 13. PROYECTO JUSTICIA VIVA National Chamber for Terrorism, The Work regarding Cases of Terrorism (Sala Penal Nacional, el Trabajo en los Casos de Terrorismo). Lima: Justicia Viva, March 2005, p.10.