135. In addition, regarding the alleged violation of Article 2 owing to the alleged nonconformity with the Convention of article 205 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Court notes that the proven facts reveal that the officials failed to comply with this provision. Consequently, a ruling on the conventionality of this would constitute a theoretical ruling, and it is not incumbent on this Court to make this type of ruling in a contentious case.169 Based on all the above, the Court does not find it necessary to rule on the alleged violation of Article 2 of the Convention. However, the Court notes that it would be desirable to adapt this article to the actual technology for identification and verification of arrest warrant records. VII-3 RIGHTS TO PERSONAL INTEGRITY AND TO PRIVACY 170 A. Arguments of the parties and of the Commission 136. The Commission argued that “the existence of serious acts of physical and psychological violence […] against Azul Rojas Marín was proved” for three reasons: (i) Azul Rojas Marín “has made consistent statements” about the events that occurred during her detention. “The fact that, in her first statement, Azul Rojas Marín described some forms of sexual abuse and then supplemented her description” did not refute the credibility of her version of the facts; (ii) despite the deficiencies in the forensic medical examination, the report documented physical injuries “compatible with some of the acts that she reported,” and (iii) having already established that “the deprivation of liberty of Azul Rojas Marín was unlawful, arbitrary and discriminatory,” the State created the situation of risk for her personal safety. It also considered that the elements required to consider the said acts as torture were present. 137. The representatives argued that “discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender expression was the reason for the sexual violence and [rape] of Azul, which signified a form of violation of her sexual liberty due, above all, to this prejudice.” They indicated that it was “fully proved that Azul Rojas Marín was a victim of sexual violence, including rape, by agents of the Peruvian State.” They characterized the acts as torture “in view of the severity of the violence suffered by Azul.” Regarding the intentionality of the acts, they argued that “the acts committed by the serenazgo agents and the police were deliberate, intentional and calculated.” With regard to the severity, they indicated that “severe physical and mental suffering is inherent in rape.” Regarding the purpose, they considered that “the torture and inhuman treatment to which Azul was subjected sought to humiliate and punish her owing to her sexual orientation.” They argued that an additional motive “had been to obtain information from the victim concerning the whereabouts of her brother.” In addition to constituting acts of torture, they considered that “all the forms of violence suffered by Azul (that is, the rape, the other forms of physical violence and the verbal aggression) involved a form of arbitrary and abusive interference in her privacy.” Lastly, they indicated that “the lack of due diligence in the investigation by the system of justice” in this case “constitute[d] cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment according to the American Convention.” In this regard, the Court recalls that “[t]he contentious jurisdiction of the Court is not intended to review domestic laws in the abstract, but is exercised to decide concrete cases in which it is alleged that an act [or omission] of the State, executed against certain persons, is contrary to the Convention.” Cf. International Responsibility for the Promulgation and Enforcement of Laws in Violation of the Convention (Arts. 1 and 2 American Convention on Human Rights). Advisory Opinion OC-14/94 of December 9, 1994. Series A No. 14, para. 48, and Case of the National Association of Discharged and Retired Employees of the National Tax Administration Superintendence (ANCEJUBSUNAT) v. Peru. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of November 21, 2019. Series C No. 394. 203. 169 170 Articles 5 and 11 of the Convention. 36