B.1 Obligation to receive the complaint 176. The Court finds it essential that police and jurisdictional agencies offer accessible mechanisms for filing complaints and that these are well publicized.219 In this case, the presumed victim has stated that, on February 25, 2008, she went to the Police Station to report the facts, but her complaint was not received.220 Meanwhile, three state agents denied that the presumed victim had come forward to file a complaint on February 25 or 26, 2008.221 On this point, it is the representatives who must prove to the Court that the presumed victim went to file a complaint on February 25, which they could have done, for example, by presenting statements by persons who were with the presumed victim that day. Consequently, the Court considers that it has no evidence to conclude that the presumed victim went to the police station to report the facts before February 27, 2008. 177. Therefore, the State did not violate Articles 8(1) and 25 of the Convention based on the above. B.2 Due diligence in the investigation 178. The Court has indicated that the obligation to investigate established in the American Convention is reinforce by the provisions of Articles 1, 6 and 8 of the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture which oblige the States to “take effective measures to prevent and punish torture within their jurisdiction,” and also “to prevent and punish other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.” 179. The Court has developed specific standards on how to investigate sexual violence in cases in which the victims have been women. These standards are based above all on the provisions of the Istanbul Protocol and the World Health Organization’s Guidelines for medicolegal care for victims of sexual violence,222 which describe measures that should be taken in cases of sexual violence, regardless of whether the victims are men or women. Therefore, these same standards are applicable in this case. 180. This Court has stipulated that, in a criminal investigation into sexual violence, it is necessary that: (i) the victim’s statement is taken in a safe and comfortable environment that offers privacy and inspires confidence; (ii) the victim’s statement is recorded to avoid or limit Cf. Case of Quispialaya Vilcapoma v. Peru. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of November 23, 2015. Series C No. 308, para. 207. 219 In her first statement, the presumed victim indicated that a police agent refused to receive it because “the major had told him that he could not receive the complaint at the police station.” Subsequently, in the expansion of her statement, she indicated that he could not receive it “because the major was not there.” Cf. Statement made by Azul Rojas Marín at the Casa Grande Police Station on February 28, 2008 (evidence file, folios 2811 and 2812), and Expansion of the statement made by Azul Rojas Marín at the Casa Grande Police Station on March 6, 2008 (evidence file, folio 2817). 220 In particular, the police major denied that he had given orders not to receive the presumed victim’s complaint. Another police agent, DPP, indicated that he was unaware whether the presumed victim had come to the police station to file a complaint, “but, if that had been the case, the agent on guard would have advised me that [she] wanted to file a complaint because I am in charge of investigations.” Lastly, the agent who supposedly had refused to receive the complaint indicated that Ms. Rojas Marín had not come to the police station to file a complaint on either February 25 or 26, 2008. He also affirmed that it was false that he had said that he could not receive the complaint. Cf. Statement made by the major of the Peruvian National Police before the Second Provincial Corporate Criminal Prosecution Service of Ascope on April 18, 2008 (evidence file, folio 2785); Statement made by DPP at the Casa Grande Police Station on March 7, 2008 (evidence file, folio 2770), and Statement made by JVP at the Casa Grande Police Station on April 22, 2008 (evidence file, folio 2781). 221 Cf. Case of Fernández Ortega et al. v. Mexico. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs, supra, para. 194, and Case of Rosendo Cantú et al. v. Mexico. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs, supra, para. 178. 222 47