A. State’s request for interpretation regarding the direct incorporation of the rights derived from article 26 of the Convention A.1 Arguments of the State and of the Commission 12. The State requested clarif ication of operative paragraph f ourth of the judgment, which states that Guatemala is “responsible f or the violation of the right to strike, to f reedom of association, to f reedom to organize and the right to work and to job security, recognized in Articles 16 and 26 of the American Convention”. It pointed out that “there is a discrepancy regarding the justiciability of the ESCER, in relation to the practice of grouping together said rights in a direct or autonomous way, by virtue of the f act that there is no conventional clause granting recognition or protection of the right to strike and to work and to social stability. Theref ore, based on the application of the Protocol of San Salvador and article 16 of the Convention, those rights have be en protected through the theory of connection”. 13. It argued that “the right to strike, to work and to social stability were not expressly stated in article 26 of the [Convention],” and thus it considered it was as “important [...] to elaborate on the scope of the [j]udgment in order to endorse the direct incorporation of those rights into the catalog of protected rights derived f rom article 26 [of the Convention], the evident relationship mentioned in the judgment on merits towards the right to strike, to work and to social stability and the legal consequences thereof , in view of the aspects of the instant case and its recognition as immediately enf orceable rights.” 14. The Commission considered that “the Court broadly explained the scope of article 26 of the Convention [...] and the way it ‘incorporated the so-called economic, social, cultural and environmental rights (ESCER) into its catalog of protected rights, derived f rom the norms recognized in the Charter of the Organization of American States [...], as well as the rules of interpretation set f orth in Article 29 of the Convention.” Theref ore, it considered that “the request f or interpretation submitted by the State should be declared inadmissible.” A.2 Considerations of the Court 15. The Court reiterates that it considers it inadmissible to use a request f or interpretation to submit considerations on f actual and legal matters that have already been submitted at the proper procedural moment and on which the Court has already taken a decision. 16. In this respect, it recalls that, as f rom paragraph 100 of the judgment, the Court declared it was competent to hear the issues related to article 26 of the American Convention as an integral part of the rights established therein and to declare the responsibility of a State who has consented to be bound by the Convention and has recognized, in addition, the contentious jurisdiction of the Inter -American Court. 17. Moreover, the Court reiterates that paragraphs 128 and 129 of the judgment established the f ollowing: 128. With regard to the specific labor rights protected by Article 26 of the American Convention, the Court has already determined that the wording of said article ind ic ate s tha t these rights are derived from the economic, social, educational, scientific a nd cultural standards contained in the OAS Charter. In this sense, articles 45(b) a nd (c ),140, 46141 y 34.g142 of the Charter establish that “[w]ork is a right and a social duty” and that this should 4