13 The Court later specified that “in cases of […] forced disappearances and other grave human rights violations, […] the execution of a serious, impartial, and effective ex officio investigation, without delays, is a fundamental and conditioning element for the protection of certain rights that are affected or annulled by these situations, such as the right to personal liberty, humane treatment, and life.” To this end, the Tribunal reiterated its jurisprudence, according to which, an investigation must not be started “as a mere formality which is set to be unfruitful before it has even begun,” but rather “it must have a purpose and the State must adopt it as an inherent legal obligation and not a mere act of special interests that depends on the procedural initiative of the victim or its next of kin or the private presentation of evidence, without the public authority effectively seeking the truth. This is true regardless of the agent to whom the violation may be attributed to, even if they were individuals, since, if the facts are not seriously investigated they would in some way have been assisted by the public power, which would compromise the State’s international responsibility.” Likewise, the Court mentioned that an investigation must be carried out “through all legal means available” and within a reasonable period of time.19 25. Likewise, the Court reiterated that the prohibition of forced disappearance of persons and the correlated duty to investigate it and punish those responsible are regulations that “have become jus cogens in nature.”20 26. Additionally, in said Order issued in 2009, the Court reiterated that the State “has the obligation to fight [impunity] through all legal means available, since [said situation] promotes the chronic repetition of human rights violations and the complete lack of defense of the victims and their next of kin.” The Tribunal stated that this obligation implies the duty of the States to organize the entire governmental apparatus and, in general, all the structures through which it manifests its exercise of public power so that they are capable of legally guaranteeing the free and full exercise of human rights.21 27. Inter-American Court of Human Rights of January 27, 2009, Considering Clause twenty-one. 19 Cf. Case of Bámaca Velásquez v. Guatemala, supra note 18, Considering Clause twenty-eight. 20 Cf. Case of Bámaca Velásquez v. Guatemala, supra note 18, Considering Clause twenty-six. 21 Cf. Case of Bámaca Velásquez v. Guatemala, supra note 18, Considering Clause twenty-two.