71 of President Zelaya. In their reasoning, the decision-making bodies do not distinguish a citizen’s participation in a public demonstration protesting the coup d’état from demonstrations in support of a particular political party or candidate. 239. Given the foregoing considerations, the State has failed to show that the sanction imposed is somehow mandated by the need to protect the independence and impartiality of the Judiciary as an institution, or that of Judge López Lone in particular. A public demonstration staged to protest the coup d’état need not necessarily be construed as an act that violates these principles. Furthermore, punishing a judge for expressing his support for the restoration of constitutional order in a democratic crisis like the one that Honduras experienced at that time does not seem to be an effective means of safeguarding the principles of judicial independence and autonomy. It is an exaggeration to claim that the Judicial Branch’s independence and impartiality are somehow threatened by the alleged victim’s participation in a protest of the kind described here. While it is true that appearances matter when it comes to instilling confidence in the courts, to achieve such an end the disciplinary body should have objectively and reasonably dispelled any doubts in this regard. 240. For the reasons explained in the preceding paragraphs, the Commission deems that the dismissal of Judge López Lone was neither appropriate nor necessary to protect the guarantees of independence and impartiality that must govern judicial practice. Nor can dismissal be deemed a proportional measure. In effect, in the present case the most severe punishment allowed under the law was applied, even though it was not warranted based on the seriousness of the harm done, which was never proven. The severity of the measure cut short the alleged victim’s career in the judiciary, with all the negative connotations that has. 241. In the case of Kudeshkina v. Russia, cited previously, the European Court held that the removal of a judge for criticizing the judiciary’s lack of independence “was undoubtedly a severe penalty (…).This was the strictest available penalty that could be imposed in the disciplinary proceedings and (…) in the light of the Court’s findings above, did not correspond to the gravity of the offence. Moreover, it could undoubtedly discourage other judges in the future from making statements critical of public institutions or policies, for fear of the loss of judicial office.”309 As the European Court wrote, the “chilling effect” that the removal of the judge in that case had on the exercise of freedom of expression works to the detriment of society as a whole, and is likewise a factor which concerns the proportionality of, and thus the justification for, the sanctions imposed on the applicant, who […] was undeniably entitled to bring to the public’s attention the matter at issue.” 310 242. The Commission finds that the European Court’s observations concerning the chilling effect of measures that restrict freedom of expression apply with equal force to the case at hand. In effect, the severity of the restriction on freedom of expression imposed in the case sub examine is compounded by the fact that it was not just Judge López Lone’s right to freedom of expression and right of assembly that were violated; instead, the dismissal sanction imposed was capable of instilling terror in other judges who might have been planning to exercise those rights amid a crisis of such importance to the democratic way of life in Honduras. The chilling effect is a factor that also has to be considered when assessing the proportionality of the restriction on freedom of expression.311 309 Case of Kudeshkina v. Russia, Judgment of February 26, 2009, paragraph 98. 310 Case of Kudeshkina v. Russia, Judgment of February 26, 2009, paragraph 99. 311 Case of Kudeshkina v. Russia, no. 29492/05, § 83, 99-100, 26 February 2009; and Kayasu v. Turkey, no. 64119/00 and 76292/01, 13 November 2008.