62 185. Meanwhile, Resolution No. 002 declared that the decision to reserve the concession assigned to RCTV and to terminate the administrative procedure was taken “to permit universal access to information […], to promote a new free-to-air television management model that would co-exist with the others that existed in the country, under the model of television as a public service, seeking to promote the democratization of the use of the broadcasting media and the plurality of messages and contents.” The Court notes that Communication No. 0424 repeated this same justification. 186. Additionally, during the public hearing, in answer to the question of its reason for deciding to reserve to itself the use of the spectrum granted to RCTV in concession, the State indicated that: This was merely [for] technical reasons. Remember that the frequencies have transmission channels; frequency 2 and 3 which is the one that RCTV has is the one closest to the earth, and it therefore has greater scope, it reaches further and needs much cheaper equipment. […] There’s no other reason. There’s no political reason; that is untrue, totally untrue. 187. Consequently, the Court notes that the arguments explicitly used as justification for the decisions taken in Communication No. 0424 and Resolution No. 002, were “the democratization of the use of the broadcasting media and the plurality of messages and contents.” Therefore, the Court will now determine whether this purpose can be considered legitimate. 188. Regarding the legitimacy of this purpose, the Court recalls what it has established previously with regard to the importance of pluralism in a democratic society (supra paras. 144 and 145); thus, it considers that the protection of pluralism is not only a legitimate objective, but also a necessary one. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the purpose declared by the State in Communication No. 0424 and Resolution No. 002 was legitimate. 189. Nevertheless, both the Inter-American Commission and the representatives have affirmed that this was not the real objective, because there was evidence that proved that the intention was to punish RCTV for its editorial line that was critical of the government. In this regard, in the instant case, the Court finds it necessary to take into account that the motive or purpose of a specific act of the State authorities is relevant for the legal analysis of a case, 272 because a motivation or purpose that differs from that of the norm that grants the state authority the power to act may show whether the action may be considered an arbitrary act, 273 Case of the Supreme Court of Justice (Quintana Coello et al.) v. Ecuador. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of August 23, 2013. Series C No. 266, para. 173, and Case of the Constitutional Tribunal (Camba Campos et al.) v. Ecuador. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of August 28, 2013. Series C No. 268, para. 210. 272 Case of the Supreme Court of Justice (Quintana Coello et al.) v. Ecuador. In this regard, the European Court has taken into account the purpose or motivation that the State authorities revealed when exercising their functions to determine whether the European Convention on Human Rights had been violated. For example in the Case of Gusinskiy v. Russia, the European Court considered that the restriction of the victim’s right to liberty, authorized by Article 5(1)(c) of the European Convention, was not only “for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence,” but also with the purpose of obliging him to sell his company to the State. In the Case of Cebotari v. Moldavia, it declared that Article 18 of the European Convention had been violated because “the government had failed to satisfy the Court that there was a reasonable suspicion that the applicant had committed an offence” and concluded “that the real aim of the criminal proceedings and of the applicant’s arrest and detention was to put pressure on him with a view to hindering Oferta Plus from pursuing its application before the Court.” Lastly, in the Case of Lutsenko v. Ukraine, the European Court determined “that the restriction of the applicant’s liberty, [authorized by Article 5(1)(c),] was applied not only for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence, but also for other reasons” related to the “prosecuting authorities’ […] attempt to punish the applicant for publicly disagreeing with accusations against him.” Cf. ECHR, Case of Gusinskiy v. Russia, (No. 70276/01), Judgment of May 19, 2004, paras. 71 to 78; Case of Cebotari v. Moldavia, (No. 35615/06), Judgment of November 13, 2007, paras. 46 to 53, and Case of Lutsenko v. Ukraine, (No. 6492/11), Judgment of July 3, 2012, paras. 100 to 110. 273