67 B) Alleged discrimination against RCTV B.1. Arguments of the Commission and of the parties 200. The Commission considered that “regulation of the electromagnetic spectrum should ensure, simultaneously, the freedom of expression of the greatest number of people and viewpoints, equal opportunities for access to the media, and the right to pluralist and diverse information for contemporary societies.” In this regard, it argued the violation of both Articles 1(1) and 24 of the Convention, stressing that “while the general obligation under Article 1(1) refers to the duty of the State to respect and ensure ‘without discrimination’ the rights set forth in the American Convention, Article 24 protects the right to ‘equal protection of the law.’” The Commission underlined that “Article 24 of the American Convention prohibits discrimination, de jure or de facto, in respect not only of the rights enshrined in that instrument but in all laws enacted by the State and their application.” 201. Regarding the presumed violation of the right to equality, the Commission divided its analysis into different aspects of this right including, in particular: the existence of a “differential treatment,” and the determination of “whether there were sufficient [objective] reasons to justify and continue that treatment.” Regarding the existence of a differential treatment, it asserted that “[i]n this case, the Commission has considered proved the existence of a difference in treatment given to two television stations whose technical and legal conditions were identical, because one of them had its license to exploit the electromagnetic spectrum renewed, while renewal of RCTV’s license was refused.” 202. Regarding the existence of sufficient objective reasons to justify or continue this treatment, the Commission had recourse to the assessment of the appropriate balance of interests which, in its interpretation, “makes it necessary to determine, first, whether the differential treatment seeks a legitimate purpose and whether it is useful, necessary and strictly proportionate to achieve this purpose.” 203. The Commission argued that “[i]n evidentiary terms, it should be recalled that, having demonstrated a reasonable indication of the existence of a distinction based on a suspect category – political opinions – the burden of proof falls on the State.” Similarly, the Commission stated that “[e]ven in the presence of suspect categories prohibited by Article 1(1) of the Convention, the organs responsible for ensuring that this international instrument is applied, must ensure that the measure is indispensable to achieve the essential purpose and that its implementation is substantially more advantageous than the cost that those who do not benefit from it must support,” because, according to the Commission, “the objective pursued by way of the differential treatment should be a particularly important purpose or a pressing social need.” 204. Bearing in mid this evidentiary standard, the Commission concluded that the purpose was not legitimate because it “found that the said decision was taken in order to penalize the channel for its critical political opinions and to send a message to the other Venezuelan media concerning the consequences of not following the news and editorial line indicated by the government.” The Commission concluded that “the State has not presented any arguments or evidence demonstrating a relationship between the legitimate purpose of promoting pluralism and the State’s conduct in not renewing the RCTV concession based on the channel’s political opinion.” 205. Regarding the applicable international law, the representatives established the grounds for the presumed violation of Article 24 of the Convention by stating that the “Court had interpreted that any distinction that lacked an objective and reasonable justification was