90 311. The representatives argued both the violation of Article 8 owing to “a violation of the judicial guarantee to be heard with no undue delay,” and the violation of Article 25 of the Convention owing to “a violation of the human right to effective judicial protection.” They argued that “it took 90 days – that is, three months – for the application for amparo to receive only the initial ruling on it admissibility and, as if this delay was not enough, the presiding judge declared that the application was inadmissible.” They added that “[t]he Constitutional Chamber merely had to verify the presence of a series of simple and formal requirements in order to process the application for amparo, a matter that, according to the law, should not take more than three days.” 312. The representatives also argued that the delay had an impact on the violation of the rights of the presumed victims because “during this 90-day delay, the violation against which the protection had been requested was consummated by the issue of the order to close down RCTV by the Minister of the People’s Power for Telecommunications and Information Technology.” They also argued that “[t]he judge of the Constitutional Chamber merely waited until the violation had been committed and until RCTV had filed a request for ordinary protection before another Chamber of the same Court before responding that the amparo was inadmissible because the unlawful administrative act had been contested using the ordinary remedy of the appeal for nullification. 313. The State reiterated its argument that “all the constitutional courts in the world have a backlog of cases and priority must be given to the cases that are most delayed based on the principle that everyone is equal before the law. In addition, in the case of RCTV, the Venezuelan constitutional principle prevailed which establishes that the “collective interest has preference over the individual interest.” B.1.2. Considerations of the Court 314. The Inter-American Court has indicated that Article 25(1) of the Convention establishes the obligation of the States Parties to ensure to everyone subject to their jurisdiction an effective remedy against acts that violate their fundamental rights. 339 This effectiveness also means that, in addition to the formal existence of such remedies, they must provide results or solutions to any violation of the rights established in the Convention, the Constitution or the law.340 In addition, the Court has established that, for a remedy to be effective, it is not sufficient that it is established in the Constitution or by law, or that it is formally admissible; rather, it must be truly appropriate to establish whether a human rights violation has occurred and to provide whatever is necessary to redress this. Those remedies that are illusory, owing to the general situation in the country or even the particular circumstances of the case, cannot be considered effective.341 Consequently, the State has the responsibility not only to elaborate an effective remedy and enact it into law, but also to ensure the proper application of this remedy by its judicial authorities.342 Cf. Case of the Saramaka People v. Suriname. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of November 28, 2007. Series C No. 172, para. 177, and Case of Argüelles et al. v. Argentina, para. 145. 339 Cf. Case of Mejía Idrovo v. Ecuador. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of July 5, 2011. Series C No. 288, para. 95, and Case of Argüelles et al. v. Argentina, para. 145. 340 Cf. Case of Ivcher Bronstein v. Peru, para. 137, and Case of the Constitutional Tribunal (Camba Campos et al.) v. Ecuador, para. 228. 341 Cf. Case of the “Street Children” (Villagrán Morales et al.) v. Guatemala. Merits. Judgment of November 19, 1999. Series C No. 63, para. 237, and Case of Liakat Ali Alibux v. Suriname. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of January 30, 2014. Series C No. 276, para. 116. 342