94 to participate, in equal conditions, in an open and transparent renewal process with clear, objective and non-discriminatory criteria. The Commission concluded that even if the nonrenewal of the RCTV concession had an effect on the property of the television station’s shareholders, it had not been proved that the concession itself formed part of the shareholders’ property. 326. The representatives argued that, in this case, the broad concept of the right to property protected by the Convention and that of its purpose was applicable because various property rights were involved: the shares, the RCTV concession, and the seizure of the RCTV assets. They explained that, for the effects of this case, the diverse nature of this property required establishing the scope of the protection of property provided by the Convention, in light of the purpose of the right to property. They argued that, just as the protection offered to the owner is broad, so is the range of property involved, as regards the tangible and intangible items that may be subject to ownership, and ownership of which may be understood as the right to property. 327. Additionally, the representatives argued that property is not only a human right in itself, but can have numerous functions linked to the exercise of other human rights, and the protection provided against violations of the right to property is frequently related to the violation of other human rights and their international protection. The representatives linked the right to property to freedom of expression when arguing that, by creating, acquiring or operating a media outlet, its owner becomes involved, through the right to property, in the activity protected by Article 13 of the Convention. They added that private ownership of a media outlet is the legal structure that guarantees the independence and plurality of the media. They argued that the type of limits or interferences that the law may impose on property should be adapted to the requirements of freedom of expression when the property is the vehicle for its exercise, because violation of the property of a media outlet may involve an illegitimate (direct or indirect) restriction of freedom of expression. In the case of RCTV, the representatives argued that the television channel was not an ordinary company, and the interests at stake were not limited to preserving a commercial establishment, but stemmed from the fact that it was a media outlet through which freedom of expression was exercised including, at times, commentaries that were critical to the government’s administration. 328. The representatives argued that the RCTV concession, as protected property, whose ownership for the exclusive use of a television frequency involved an economically useful and productive asset, in other words a capital asset that, due to its nature, could be used and enjoyed, fell within the sphere of protection guaranteed by Article 21 of the Convention. They underscored that the concession was a property right that could be expropriated and that this did not only include expropriation in the sense legitimately conceived under domestic law and international law, but was also subject to illegitimate forms of “deprivation” prohibited by Article 21(2) of the Convention, according to which “[n]o one shall be deprived of his property,” except for expropriations carried out in accordance with the law. The representatives argued that the limitations to property must be clearly established by a formal law that is sufficiently clear so that such limitations are predictable and respect the essential content of the right to property. They argued that the maximum limitation that may be imposed on the right to property is expropriation, which is understood to be the effective elimination of the right to property, whether or not a judicial expropriation procedure has been filed and whether or not the owner has been deprived of formal ownership of the right or whether this has been transferred to the expropriator or a third party. They added that the relevant point was the illegitimate elimination of the right to property, and not that the property had been transferred to the State or to another person or entity. 329. The representatives argued that the State had also violated the right to property guaranteed by Article 21 of the Convention when it decided to seize RCTV’s tangible assets in