103. Based on the foregoing, the Court appreciates the State’s willingness to make the pertinent legislative reforms in order to adapt, inter alia, article 332 of the Penal Code to the Convention, and grants it one year to inform the Court of the adoption of the said amendments. In addition, when revising, amending or reforming the definition of the offense of unlawful association in Honduras, the State must take into account the relevant standards developed by the Court in its case law. 104. In this regard, it should be mentioned that the general obligation of the State to adapt its domestic law to the provisions of the American Convention in order to guarantee the rights established therein, pursuant to Article 2, entails the adoption of two types of measures, namely: (a) the elimination of norms and practices of any kind that involve violation of the guarantees established in the Convention or that disregard the rights recognized therein or prevent their exercise, and (b) the enactment of laws and the implementation of practices leading to real respect for these guarantees. The first measure is complied with by the reform, repeal or annulment of the laws or practices that have these implications, as applicable. The second obliges the State to prevent the recurrence of human rights violations; hence, the State must take all necessary legal, administrative and other measures to prevent similar facts from occurring in the future.108 105. In this regard, the Court recalls that the principle of criminal legality requires that the definition of an offense must use clear, precise terms that plainly describe the conducts liable to punishment, establish their elements, and allow them to be distinguished from conducts that are not punishable or unlawful conduct penalized by non-criminal measures.109 Any ambiguity in the definition of offenses leads to doubts and allows the authority to use its discretion, which is particularly undesirable when establishing the criminal responsibility of the individual and penalizing this with punishments that severely affect fundamental rights such as life or liberty. This has particular significance for the role of the judge who, when applying criminal law, must adhere strictly to its provisions and observe the utmost rigor in matching the conduct of the accused to the definition of the preserve the law, because only the legislature is empowered to regulate the scope of the law,” and that “[t]he definition contained in article 332 of the Honduran Penal Code, by incorporating the concepts “the heads or ringleaders of a mara or gang shall be punished […],” unquestionably contradicts the principle of guilt as it relates to responsibility for the act, and opens up a grave possibility of persecution based merely on suspicion, appearance and prejudice.” Expert opinion provided by Marco Antonio Canteo during the public hearing of the case on February 28, 2012 (merits report, tome I, folios. 621 to 645), and see: Cf. Expert opinion provided by Carlos TifferSotomayor during the public hearing of the Case of Servellón García et al. v. Honduras on December 19, 2005, incorporated into the body of evidence under the thirteenth operative paragraph of the Order of the President of the Court of January 27, 2012, supra note 4 (merits report, tome II, folios 834 to 854). 108 In this regard, Marco Antonio Canteo stated that “because the definition of the crime of unlawful association does not establish the scope and characteristics that define membership in a mara or gang, it is extremely difficult for the Public Prosecution Service to develop the factual basis and bring to trial those accused of this offense. […] This opens up a latent possibility that it is the agents of justice […] who complete the parameters of the definition owing to the said imprecision, thus violating the principle of legality, as it relates to the absolute preserve the law, because only the legislature is empowered to regulate the scope of the law,” and that “[t]he definition contained in article 332 of the Honduran Penal Code, by incorporating the concepts “the heads or ringleaders of a mara or gang shall be punished […],” unquestionably contradicts the principle of guilt as it relates to responsibility for the act, and opens up a grave possibility of persecution based merely on suspicion, appearance and prejudice.” Expert opinion provided by Marco Antonio Canteo during the public hearing of the case on February 28, 2012 (merits report, tome I, folios. 621 to 645), and see: Cf. Expert opinion provided by Carlos TifferSotomayor during the public hearing of the Case of Servellón García et al. v. Honduras on December 19, 2005, incorporated into the body of evidence under the thirteenth operative paragraph of the Order of the President of the Court of January 27, 2012, supra note 4 (merits report, tome II, folios 834 to 854). 109 Cf. Case of Castillo Petruzzi et al. v. Peru. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of May 30, 1999. Series C No. 52, para. 121, and Case of Usón Ramírez v. Venezuela. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of November 20, 2009. Series C No. 207, para. 55. 30