at the eventual stage of execution of judgment established in the Venezuelan system of criminal procedure.” 29 The Commission’s action has had another consequence that exceeds the provisions of international law, which is that the determination on admissibility was issued, not on the basis of the last decision of the State which, on October 12, 2005, had given rise to its international responsibility under international law, but principally on its decisions after that date. 4. Inadmissibility of the petition with regard to facts relating to irregularities in the criminal proceedings Now, based on the above distinction that it made with regard to the petition, the Commission declared it inadmissible regarding “the presumed irregularities of the criminal proceedings,” because, owing to “the waiver of the right to appeal the adverse judgment […] the Commission found that, for these facts, the domestic remedies had not been exhausted and that, given the failure to comply with this requirement, the exceptions established in Article 46(2) of the American Convention had not been met.” 30 By doing this, the Commission not only considered events that had occurred after October 12, 2005; namely the adverse judgment of April 29, 2008, and even the convicted man’s waiver to appeal the judgment on July 17, 2008, 31 but failed to deduce the corresponding logical conclusions from them. In other words, if it had considered the petition as a whole, as the petitioner requested, the way it proceeded would not have been possible. This is because the inadmissibility decided exclusively with regard to the irregularities in the criminal proceedings underway against Mr. Díaz Peña that, as mentioned, should have been established because at the time of the petition, the domestic remedies had not been previously exhausted, logically should also have resulted in inadmissibility with regard to the preventive detention and the duration of the proceedings, and to the detention conditions and to the lack of medical attention, because these circumstances occurred in the context of the said proceedings and not separate from them or with no close connection to them. As already indicated, the Judgment validated the procedure followed by the Commission when it indicated, regarding “the facts related to ‘a group of irregularities in the criminal proceedings,’ […] the petition was declared inadmissible and, therefore, they do not form part of the factual framework of the instant case.” 32 Based on this statement in the Judgment, the Court appears to renounce the exercise of its “authority […], in matters it is considering, […] to monitor the legality of the Commission’s conduct, which does not necessarily mean reviewing the proceedings conducted before the latter, unless there has been a grave error that violates the right to defense of the parties.” 33 This is because the said authority must be exercised if the State, despite having asserted the objection of failure to previously exhaust domestic remedies before the Commission, asserts this before the Court also; provided this is based on the “rule … [that this] is a defense available to the State”; 34 hence, not only and exclusively with regard to whether or not domestic remedies existed at the time of the petition, but basically regarding the decision which, on that occasion, the Commission adopted. Thus, it is specifically with regard to the decision taken by the 29 Para. 120. 30 Para. 119(f). 31 Para. 88. 32 Para. 121. 33 Para. 115. 34 Para. 114. 7