- 10 27. The Court recalls that the rule of prior exhaustion of domestic remedies was conceived in the interests of the State, because it seeks to exempt it from responding before an international organ for acts it is accused of before it has had the occasion to remedy them by its own means. 14 Nevertheless, the subsidiary nature of the inter-American system is not affected by the fact that the analysis of compliance with the requirement of exhaustion of domestic remedies is made based on the situation when a decision is taken on a petition’s admissibility. To the contrary, if any domestic remedy is pending, the State has the opportunity to resolve the situation alleged during the admissibility stage. 28. In addition, the Court considers that it would be contrary to the principle of procedural economy if petitions were not admitted based on the fact that, at the time of the initial presentation, domestic remedies had not been exhausted and if, when the admissibility of these remedies was analyzed, they had already been exhausted. The European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter “the European Court”) has ruled similarly in some cases,15 as has the International Court of Justice in relation to access to its jurisdiction.16 14 Cf. Case of Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras. Merits. Judgment of July 29, 1988. Series C No. 4, para. 61, and Case of Cruz Sánchez et al. v. Peru, supra, para. 48. 15 In general, the European Court has considered that domestic remedies should normally have been exhausted when lodging a petition, but has recognized that this rule is subject to exceptions, so that this exhaustion can be achieved shortly after the lodging of the petition, provided this is before its admissibility is determined. However, the European Court has also emphasized that the rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies should be applied with a certain degree of flexibility and without formalistic interpretations (ECHR, Case of Ringeisen v. Austria, No. 2614/65. Judgment of 16 July 1971, para. 89), and has therefore admitted petitions where domestic remedies have not been exhausted when the petition is lodged, but were exhausted when the decision on admissibility was made, even when the exhaustion occurred years later. In this regard, see the cases: ECHR, Case of Trabelsi v. Belgium, No. 140/10. Judgment of September 4, 2014, para. 92. In this case, the European Court considered a petition admissible, inter alia, considering that, in any case, the extradition process ended before the decision on admissibility (even though this was four years after the presentation of the petition). ECHR, Case of Enzile Özdemir v. Turkey, No. 54169/00, January 8, 2008, para. 36. In this case, the European Court admitted a petition lodged five years before the corresponding criminal proceedings had ended, considering that those proceedings were exhausted when the Court examined admissibility. ECHR, Kopylov v. Russia, No 3933/04. Judgment of 29 July 2010, para. 119. In this case, the European Court admitted a petition lodged more than four years before the decision that exhausted the remedies, considering that the State’s objection of exhaustion of domestic remedies had no purpose when the Court decided on admissibility, because those remedies had been exhausted following the presentation of the initial petition. 16 In this regard, in 1924, in the case of the Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, the Permanent Court of International Justice established that the fact that it did not have jurisdiction when the application was filed was not a sufficient reason to reject its jurisdiction, if this circumstance was rectified subsequently: “Even assuming that before that time [when the application was filed] the Court had no jurisdiction because the international obligation referred to in Article 11 [of the Mandate for Palestine] was not yet effective, it would always have been possible for the applicant to re-submit his application in the same terms after the coming into force of the Treaty of Lausanne, and in that case, the argument in question could not have been advanced. Even if the grounds on which the institution of proceedings was based were defective for the reason stated, this would not be an adequate reason for the dismissal of the applicant’s suit. The Court, whose jurisdiction is international, is not bound to attach to matters of form the same degree of importance which they might possess in municipal law. Even, therefore, if the application were premature because the Treaty of Lausanne had not yet been ratified, this circumstance would now be covered by the subsequent deposit of the necessary ratifications.” Permanent Court of International Justice, Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, Judgment of 30 August 1924, Series A, No. 2, p. 34. This opinion was adopted by the International Court of Justice in the cases concerning the Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua and the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide. In the former, the International Court of Justice established that: “It would make no sense to require Nicaragua now to institute fresh proceedings based on the [1956] Treaty [of Friendship], which it would be fully entitled to do.” Case concerning the Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment, I.C.J. 1984 Reports, paras. 80 to 83. In the case of the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide, the International Court of Justice established that: “It would not be in the interests of justice to oblige the Applicant, if it wishes to pursue its claims, to initiate fresh proceedings. In this respect it is of no importance which condition was unmet at the date the proceedings were instituted, and thereby prevented the Court at that time from exercising its jurisdiction, once it has been fulfilled subsequently. [… I]t is concern for judicial economy, an element of the requirements of the sound administration of justice, which justifies application of the jurisprudence deriving from the Mavrommatis Judgment in appropriate cases. The purpose of this jurisprudence is to prevent the needless proliferation of proceedings.” Case of the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia), Preliminary objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2008, paras. 87 and 89, and Cf. Case of the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), Preliminary objections, Judgment, I.C.J. 1996 Reports, para. 26.