of the department of Lima. 75 One of the first acts of the group was the murder of the Deputy Mayor of Gorgor. 76 After 1987, Shining Path’s strategy in this region consisted in actions such as annihilating authorities, attacking police posts, and murdering the villagers who resisted their rules of conduct. 77 61. In response to the growing presence of Shining Path in this area, a state of emergency was declared and, at the beginning of the 1990s, the Army was put in control of public order for a prolonged period. 78 62. The violence attained its greatest intensity from 1989 to 1993. 79 It is known that, between April 1991 and May 1992, at least three villagers – including Jeremías Osorio Rivera – from the community of Nunumia, Gorgor district, were detained and taken to the Cajatambo Countersubversive Base, and nothing is known of their whereabouts since that time. 80 C. The Palmira Plan of Operations 63. The “Palmira Plan of Operations” was executed from April 22 to 30, 1991. Its purpose was to conduct patrols and “to capture terrorists” in the area of Palmira, as well as to organize civic activities and self-defense committees. 81 The Palmira Plan of Operations was supposed to be executed by all the Counter-subversive Bases of the 77th Armored Infantry Battalion 82 that were under the orders of Lieutenant Colonel Arnulfo Roncal Vargas, who was also the Military and Political Chief of Security Zone No. 1. 83 64. Under the Palmira Plan of Operations, on April 22, 1991, an Army patrol from the Cajatambo Counter-subversive Base with around 20 to 30 soldiers, led by Peruvian Army 75 Cf. Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Informe Final, 2003, volume IV, Chapter 1.6, pp. 470 to 472; Available at http://cverdad.org.pe/ifinal/. 76 Cf. Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Informe Final, 2003, volume IV, Chapter 1.6, p. 470; Available at http://cverdad.org.pe/ifinal/. 77 Cf. Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Informe Final, 2003, volume IV, Chapter 1.6, pp. 473 to 480; Available at http://cverdad.org.pe/ifinal/. 78 Cf. Supreme Decree No. 016-DE/SG of April 2, 1991 (evidence file, volume IX, annex 16 to the State’s answering brief, folio 4649). 79 Cf. Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Informe Final, 2003, volume IV, Chapter 1.6, p. 473; Available at http://cverdad.org.pe/ifinal/. 80 Cf. Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Informe Final, 2003, Annex IV, volume XVII, Cases of the department of Lima reported to the CVR, province of Cajatambo, pp. 131 to 133 (evidence file, volume IV, annex 18 to the submission of the case, folios 1655 to 1657). 81 Cf. Testimonial statement made by Arnulfo Roncal Vargas before the Military Investigating Judge on September 22, 1993 (evidence file, volume IV, annex 26 to the submission of the case, folio 1763); Statement made by the witness Arnulfo Roncal Vargas before the National Criminal Chamber during the fourteenth session of the oral proceeding held on March 18, 2011 (evidence file, volume IX, annex 18 to the State’s answering brief, folios 4663 and 4664); Preliminary statement made by Juan Carlos César Tello Delgado before the Fourth Supraprovincial Court on May 8, 2007 (evidence file, volume IX, annex 22 to the State’s answering brief, folio 4771), and Judgment delivered by the National Criminal Chamber on December 17, 2008 (evidence file, volume IX, annex 20 to the State’s answering brief, folios 4732 and 4746). 82 Cf. Judgment delivered by the National Criminal Chamber on December 17, 2008 (evidence file, volume IX, annex 20 to the State’s answering brief, folio 4704). 83 Cf. Statement made by the witness Arnulfo Roncal Vargas before the National Criminal Chamber during the fourteenth session of the oral proceeding held on March 18, 2011 (evidence file, volume IX, annex 18 to the State’s answering brief, folio 4663), and Preliminary statement made by Juan Carlos César Tello Delgado before the Fourth Supraprovincial Court on May 8, 2007 (evidence file, volume IX, annex 22 to the State’s answering brief, folio 4766). 23