discover the legal truth, because they were normally appropriate and, in any case, irreplaceable, to elucidate the fate of the victim and to identify those responsible for his disappearance. 185. In this regard, the rights that are being investigated make it necessary to multiply efforts as regards the measures that must be taken in order to achieve their objective, because the passage of time bears a directly proportionate relationship to the limitation – and in some case, the impossibility – of obtaining evidence and/or testimony, making it difficult and even useless or ineffective, to carry out probative measures in order to clarify the facts that are being 303 to identify the possible authors and participants, and to establish the eventual investigated, criminal responsibilities, as well as to clarify the fate of the victim and to identify those responsible for his disappearance. 186. Based on the foregoing, this Court concludes that the first investigation before the ordinary jurisdiction was not conducted in a serious, effective and exhaustive manner. ii. Investigation before the Third Permanent Military Court of Lima 187. In relation to the intervention of the military jurisdiction to examine acts that constitute human rights violations, this Court considers that it has ruled abundantly in this regard and, for the effects of the instant case, finds it sufficient to reiterate that, under the democratic rule of law, the military criminal jurisdiction must have a restrictive and exceptional scope and its purpose must be to protect special legal rights related to the functions intrinsic to the military forces. Consequently, as the Court has indicated previously, the military jurisdiction should only try soldiers on active duty for the perpetration of offenses or misdemeanors that, owing to their nature, violate legal rights relating to the military system. 304 188. In addition, taking into account the nature of the offense and the legal right violated, the military criminal jurisdiction is not the competent jurisdiction to investigate and, if appropriate, prosecute and punish the authors of human rights violations; but rather the prosecution of those responsible corresponds always to the ordinary system of justice. Thus, the Court has indicated that “[w]hen military justice assumes competence for a matter that should be heard by ordinary justice, the right to a natural judge and, a fortiori, to due process, is infringed,” 305 and this is closely related to the right of access to justice. The judge in charge of hearing a case must be competent, as well as independent and impartial. 306 Hence, the victims of human rights violations and their next of kin have the right that these violations be heard and decided by a competent court, in accordance with due process of law and access to justice. 307 189. With regard to Peru’s argument that, at the date of the facts of the case, the intervention of military justice was understood to be in keeping with the standards of the Inter-American Court at that time, the Court points out that, at least as of the judgment in the case of Durand and Ugarte 303 Cf. Case of Heliodoro Portugal v. Panama, supra, para. 150, and Case of García and family members v. Guatemala, supra, para. 135. 304 Cf. Case of Castillo Petruzzi et al. v. Peru. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of May 30, 1999. Series C No. 59, para. 128, and Case of the Santo Domingo Massacre v. Colombia, supra, para.158. 305 Case of Castillo Petruzzi et al. v. Peru, supra, para. 130, and Case of Cabrera García and Montiel Flores v. Mexico, supra, para. 197. 306 Cf. Case of Castillo Petruzzi et al. v. Peru, supra, para. 130, and Case of Cabrera García and Montiel Flores v. Mexico, supra, para. 197. 307 Cf. Case of Radilla Pacheco v. Mexico, supra, para. 275, and Case of Nadege Dorzema et al. v. Dominican Republic. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of October 24, 2012. Series C No. 251, para. 200. 69