nor the victim's representatives alleged a violation of Article 26 of the Convention, the majority was of the opinion to declare it to have been violated by virtue of the iura novit curia principle. 2. In the relevant section, the judgment states that for the examination of such violation "it is necessary to consider the position of simultaneity with the violations of other rights [...]," pointing out that "in this regard, the Court has recognized that both civil and political rights, as well as economic, social, cultural, and environmental rights, are inseparable, so that their recognition and enjoyment are unfailingly guided by the principles of universality, indivisibility, interdependence, and interrelation." 48 It then adds that both "must be categories understood in a comprehensive and unified manner as human rights without hierarchies among them and as enforceable in all cases before the competent authorities." There are two problems with this logic. 3. The first lies in the fact that the simultaneous existence of a possible violation of rights of both categories is associated with the indivisible nature of both types of rights. In other words, it is argued that, in the instant case, there has been a violation of the right established in Article 23.1 c) and, at the same time, a violation of the right to work, and that this follows from the inseparable nature of civil and political rights and social, economic, cultural, and environmental rights (hereinafter ESCER). Evidently, the same act can affect more than one right recognized in the Convention, but what happens in this case is that, despite the existence of a single area of protection (the right to remain in a job under equal conditions), not only is there a violation of the rule applicable to the factual situation analyzed (Article 23.1.c), but also, in a forced act of interpretation of the Convention, which operates to distort its text, Article 26 is also declared to have been violated. 4. The second problem is that one thing is for the rights of both categories to lack hierarchy among themselves – a correct assertion that I agree with – and another different thing is for them to be justiciable in the same manner before this Court. The second assertion does not follow from the first. 5. Once again, and as expressed in the opinions issued in the cases of Guevara Díaz v. Costa Rica, Mina Cuero v. Ecuador, Benites Cabrera v. Peru and Valencia Campos v. Bolivia, I reiterate that this Court does not have the jurisdiction to declare the autonomous violation of ESCER. 6. The theory of the direct justiciability of the ESCER generates a set of logical, legal, and practical problems, which have affected the reasonable predictability and legal certainty that this Court must guarantee. 7. Indeed, proceeding in this way circumvents the requirement that international obligations must emanate from the prior and express consent of the States; it fails to explicitly determine that the States have not granted jurisdiction to this 48 Cf. Paragraph 100. 11