Court to rule on ESCER -as stated both in the Treaty and its Additional Protocol49 ; it seeks to artificially expand the Court’s jurisdiction and departs from the rules of interpretation of the Treaty. Therefore, in practice, the content of the instrument is being altered outside the rules for its modification or amendment, 50 i.e., leading to a case-law mutation of the text. 51 8. The first basis provided to affirm the direct justiciability of the right to work is an argument of authority, since it states that "it has been recognized and protected through Article 26 of the Convention in different precedents," citing the judgment of the case of Lagos del Campo v. Peru and seven decisions subsequent to that ruling. 9. I reiterate that asserting the lack of direct justiciability of ESCER before the Court does not imply disregarding the existence or the immense importance of such rights, the interdependent and indivisible nature they have in relation to civil and political rights, nor does it mean that they are not or should not be protected. 10. It is the obligation of the States to generate the conditions for people to develop their abilities and to live a dignified life. These conditions are created when States guarantee access to ESCER rights, ideally by enshrining them in their respective Constitutions and empowering judges to make a final interpretation thereof. 52 At the domestic level, States have progressively made ESCER rights justiciable and, at the international level, the Protocol of San Salvador has been a step forward in this area, which is certainly positive. However, the fact that a certain objective is beneficial and desirable does not entitle any Court to disregard the rules that determine its jurisdiction. As has been stated, the Court has made major contributions to the protection of human rights, based on the application of the pro personae principle, without exceeding the scope of its powers. 11. Arguments can also be made in favor of the Court's jurisdiction, the affirmation of the Court itself, insofar as it "has indicated that the terms of this provision [Article 26] indicate that these consist of the rights that derive from the economic, social, educational, scientific, and cultural rules contained in the Charter of the Organization of American States (hereinafter "Charter of the OAS")." 53 First, such instrument does not confer jurisdiction on this Court. In the second place, from the reading of the norms from which this right would stem, it is evident that, in general terms, they are programmatic provisions. 12. It is not possible to interpret Articles 45(b) and (c), 46 and 34(g) referred to in Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the area of economic, social, and cultural rights (Protocol of San Salvador). 50 See articles 76(1) and 77(1) of the Convention. 51 This does not mean that the Court should not interpret the rules of the Treaty in an evolutionary manner, specifying the scope of the terms used therein, according to the context in which the facts to be subsumed in the norm are situated, as has occurred, for example, in the case of sexual orientation as a protected category, of indigenous communal property and of the concept of victim in the Inter-American Human Rights System. 52 In this vein, one of the central tenets of the capabilities approach (which is a partial theory of social justice) is that certain basic rights (ESCER rights) be enshrined in national constitutions around the world. Cf. NUSSBAUM, “Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership” (2006:314). 53 Cf. Paragraph 101. 49 12