216. The State also observed that, in “these proceedings it has been proved sufficiently that the mobilization of the population of the communities that inhabit the river valley was not caused by an act or omission that can be attributed to State agents.” Thus, it indicated that “the displacement was a de facto situation that was not caused by the Armed Forces,” and it underlined the “series of actions [undertaken] in favor of the displaced.”415 B. Considerations of the Court 217. The right to life occupies a crucial place in the American Convention, because it is the essential presumption for the exercise of the other rights.416 States have the obligation to create the conditions required so that violations of this inalienable right do not occur and, in particular, the duty to prevent their agents from violating it. This active protection of the right to life by the State involves not only its legislators, but every State institution and also those persons who must safeguard security, whether they are its police forces or its armed forces. 417 218. Furthermore, the American Convention establishes the right to personal, physical and mental integrity and its infringement “constitutes a type of violation that has different degrees […] the physical and mental effects of which vary in intensity according to endogenous and exogenous factors that must be demonstrated in each specific situation.”418 The Court has also maintained on other opportunities that the mere threat that a conduct prohibited by Article 5 of the Convention may occur, when this is sufficiently real and imminent, may, in itself, violate the right to personal integrity.419 219. Meanwhile, Article 22(1) of the Convention recognizes the right to freedom of movement and residence and not to be expelled from the territory of the State in which a person is legally. Freedom of movement is an essential condition for a person to evolve freely.420 Also, by an 415 The State indicated, specifically, that the “the Government’s first direct approach to the issue was in CONPES document 2804 of 1995, in which it approved the National Program for Comprehensive Assitance to People Displaced by Violence. It added that, owing to institutional shortcomings, a new CONPES document was issued in 1997, No. 2924 entitled National System for Comprehensive Assistance to People Displaced by Violence, which modified the institutional framework previously proposed. […] Nevertheless, in view of the urgency of the situation, the Executive and the Legislature combined efforts and Law 387 of 1997 was enacted. This law ordered comprehensive attention to the displaced population based on three stages of attention to displacement: Prevention, Humanitarian attention, and Economic stabilization […].” The State indicated that, “although, at the time of the events, Law 387 of 1997 was not in force adopting measures to prevent forced displacement, and to provide attention, protection, and economic stabilization and consolidation to those displaced internally owing to the violence in the Republic of Colombia, this law came into force on July 18 that year and, as of that time, attention to and reparation for those displaced came under the coordination of the former Social Solidarity Network which carried out activities to strengthen the management mechanisms and instances that, at the different territorial levels, implemented the System of Comprehensive Attention to the Displaced Population.” “The State: (a) provided emergency humanitarian assistance to the population that moved from the Cacarica River basin to Bocas del Atrato and to the municipality of Turbo; (b) in order to ensure the sustainability of the return of the inhabitants, it created a verification commission with the participation of a substantial number of Government ministries and institutons and international Governments and cooperation agencies, as well as representatives of the presumed victims; (c) within this framework, programs on health, housing, production projects, and family reunification and attention were implemented, among many other actions designed to attend to the displaced population, and (d) the Government also ordered the award of collective land titles over more than 100,000 hectares to the communities of the river basin.” 416 Cf. Case of the “Street Children” (Villagrán Morales et al.) v. Guatemala. Merits. Judgment of November 19, 1999. Series C No. 63, para. 144, and Case of the Santo Domingo Massacre v. Colombia. Preliminary objections, merits and reparations, para. 190. 417 Cf. Case of the “Street Children” (Villagrán Morales et al.) v. Guatemala. Merits, paras. 144 and 145, and Case of the Santo Domingo Massacre v. Colombia. Preliminary objections, merits and reparations, para. 190. 418 Case of Loayza Tamayo v. Peru. Merits. Judgment of September 17, 1997. Series C No. 33, para. 57, and Case of the Santo Domingo Massacre v. Colombia. Preliminary objections, merits and reparations, para. 191. 419 Cf. Case of the “Street Children” (Villagrán Morales et al.) v. Guatemala. Merits, para. 165, Case of the Santo Domingo Massacre v. Colombia. Preliminary objections, merits and reparations, para. 191. 420 Cf. Case of the Moiwana Community v. Suriname. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of June 15, 2005. Series C No. 124, para. 110, and Case of the Massacres of El Mozote and nearby places v. 76