277. Similarly, it should be stressed that although the Colombian Armed Forces also had the obligation to combat paramilitary groups or illegal armed groups, at the time of Operation Genesis there were no reports of a confrontation between the Armed Forces and these groups,539 even though both factions were in the area of the Salaquí River, in places very close to the objectives of Operation Genesis indicated in “Operations Order 004.” The reports following Operation Genesis underscored confrontations with the guerrilla during its implementation,540 but made no allusion whatsoever to the paramilitary groups that were there and that, logically, the Army should have combatted because those groups were carrying out operations in the same geographical areas. 278. Furthermore, it should be emphasized that the version presented by the State does not provide an answer to several points related to the facts of the instant case. In particular, this version does not explain the reasons why the paramilitary units attacked the Cacarica communities on precisely the same days as Operation Genesis was being implemented on the banks of the Salaquí and Truandó Rivers, or regarding the fact that the State was unaware of the movements of paramilitary units that had set off from Cutí (Chocó group) and from the town of Turbo (“Pedro Ponte” group).541 In this regard, it is striking that Luis E. Cardoza, expert witness proposed by the State, indicated that “intelligence, which is the basis for initiating operations, is an intelligence that must be continuously providing support to the operation; otherwise it would not be possible to modify the plans once the operations were underway.”542 Thus, the Court does not understand why the intelligence that was constantly “providing support to the operation,” did not alert the Armed Forces to the massive displacements that were occurring and to the presence of paramilitary units and, if it did, why the Armed Forces did not act to prevent or deal with the causes of the displacement of hundreds of inhabitants. In addition, the arguments presented by the State do not explain why there was no fighting between paramilitary units and the Army, when the evidence indicates that the paramilitaries continued to advance towards the Salaquí River precisely when Operation Genesis was underway. Neither do they explain why the paramilitary units were present in several of the places identified as military objectives of Operation Genesis (in particular the State did not contest the paramilitary presence in the northernmost communities). Moreover, the State’s version does not explain the statements of the demobilized paramilitaries, or several testimonies of peasants, which were investigated and verified by the Prosecutor General’s Office, and also assessed by Colombian criminal justice, indicating that there had been collaboration with the Armed Forces. 279. Lastly, the Court notes that the version of the events that has been proved in the most reasonable, satisfactory and sufficient manner indicates: (a) that before and after the events, there was a regional and national context in which different types of connections have been reported between paramilitary groups and members of the Armed Forces; in the Urabá 539 Cf. Colombian Military Forces, National Army, 17th Brigade, Reports of March 6 and 20, 1997 (evidence file, folios 5528 to 5531 and 5532 to 5537). Neither the affidavit of January 31, 2013, of María Paulina Leguizamón Zarate, expert witness proposed by the State (evidence file, folio 15413) nor the testimony of Colonel Germán Castro, provided during the public hearing of February 12, 2013, refer to confrontations between pramilitary groups and the Army. 540 Cf. Colombian Military Forces, National Army, 17th Brigade, Report of March 6, 1997 (evidence file, folios 5528 and ff.), and Colombian Military Forces, National Army, 17th Brigade, Report of March 20, 1997 (evidence file, folios 5532 and ff.). See also, Affidavit prepard by María Paulina Leguizamón Zarate, expert witness proposed by the State (evidence file, folio 15413) and Testimony of Colonel Germán Castro, witness proposed by the State, before the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights during the public hearing on February 12, 2013. 541 The foregoing is in stark contrast to the extremely precise intelligence informationo on the geographical place and the composition of the guerrilla units that appears in the intelligence reports prior to Operation Genesis. The intelligence report attached to Operations Order 004 has precise information on the exact number of guerrilla units at each objective. Cf. Testimony of Colonel Germán Castro, witness proposed by the State, before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights during the public hearing on February 12, 2013. 542 Cf. Testimony of Luis E. Cardoza, expert witness proposed by the State, before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights during the public hearing on February 12, 2013. 96