Objective 1: Tamboral;157 Objective 2: La Loma (de Salaquí) and Playa Bonita;158 Objective 3: Regadero;159 Objective 4: Caño Seco and Bocas de Guineo;160 Objective 5: Teguerre;161 Objective 6: Puente América;162 Objective 7: La Nueva,163 and Objective 8: Clavellino.164 In addition, as part of the operation, orders were given to organize control posts and blockades at the mouths of the Salaquí, Truandó and Domingodó Rivers.165 The foregoing would be executed in three stages with the support of H-212 and H-500 helicopters and attacks by soldiers brought in by helicopter166 and would include Alfa, Beta and Charlie support missions. “Alfa” missions consist in machine-gunning; “Beta” missions consist in launching bombs, and “Charlie” missions consist in launching guided rockets.167 101. As described, on February 24, 1997, the Air Force, together with troops of the Army’s 17th Brigade, began the military operation.168 Although the operation was originally planned to take place only during the last week of February, the maneuvers to occupy and secure the area, as well as the pursuit of and confrontation with subversive groups continued after that time. 169 The facts presented by the State with regard to the operation that are not disputed are: (i) that all the objectives, except for No. 6 Puente América, were attacked by the armed forces; 170 (ii) 157 According to the Intelligence report, 300 guerrillas and two N.N. (Pájaro and Marleny) were at this location. Intelligence report attached to Operations Order No. 004 “Genesis” (evidence file, folio 5515). 158 According to the Intelligence report, 20 guerrillas were at La Loma and another 250 at Playa Bonita. Intelligence report attached to Operations Order No. 004 “Genesis” (evidence file, folio 5515). 159 According to the Intelligence report, here there was an open space and a safe haven for the majority of the group, with 30 guerrillas. 160 According to the Intelligence report, N.N. (Víctor Tirado) with 350 guerrillas were located in the sector of Caño Seco and Bocas de Guineo. 161 According to the Intelligence report 80 guerrillas were at this location 162 According to the Intelligence report 90 guerrillas under the orders of N.N. (alias Roberto) were at this location. 163 According to the Intelligence report 70 guerrillas were at this location. 164 According to the Intelligence report 350 guerrillas and the leader of the María Córdoba Bloc were at this location. 165 Cf. Eighth Criminal Court of the Bogota Special Circuit, file 2009-063, defendant Rito Alejo del Río, judgment of August 23, 2012 (evidence file, folio 14808), Colombian Military Forces, National Army, 17th Brigade Operations Order No. 004 “Genesis” of February 1997, and the intelligence report in annex (evidence file, folios 1407 and 5516). 166 Stage I corresponded to the helicopter-assisted attack on Objective No. 1 and, in parallel, Objective No. 2 would be neutralized with BETA support; subsequently, the No. 35 Counterinsurgency Battalion would carry out a helicopter-assisted attack with waves of 80 men each on Objective No. 4, Caño Seco and Guineo. Stage II would be implemented when Objectives 1 and 4 had been secured and Objective No. 2 had been neutralized; it would be carried out by a helicopter-assisted attack on Objectives Nos. 3 and 5. Stage III would be initiated once Objectives Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 had been secured, when No. 35 Counterinsurgency Battalion would take control of the whole of the Salaquí River, and on receiving orders, No. 1 Special Forces Battalion would conduct a helicopter-assisted attack on Objectives Nos. 8 and 7. Colombian Military Forces, National Army, 17th Brigade, Operations Order No. 004 “Genesis” of February 1997 (evidence file, folios 1406 to 1412). See also Affidavit dated January 31, 2013, prepared by María Paulina Leguizamón Zarate, expert witness proposed by the State (evidence file, folio 15432). 167 Cf. Testimony of Luis Emilio Cardozo Santamaría, expert witness proposed by the State during the public hearing on February 12, 2013. 168 Cf. Military Forces of Colombia, 17th Brigade, Report of March 20, 1997 (evidence file, folios 5532 and 5533) and Testimony of Colonel Luis Emilio Cardozo Santamaría, expert witness proposed by the State, before the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights during the public hearing on February 12, 2013. 169 Cf. Colombian Military Forces, National Army, 17th Brigade, Reports of March 6 and 10, 1997 (evidence file, folios 5529, 5530 and 5533). See also, Affidavit dated January 31, 2013, prepared by María Paulina Leguizamón Zarate, expert witness proposed by the State (evidence file, folios 15445 to 15448) and Testimony of Colonel Luis Emilio Cardozo Santamaría, expert witness proposed by the State, before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights during the public hearing on February 12, 2013. Also, Military Forces of Colombia, General Command, Head of Joint Military Intelligence and Counterintelligence, Military analysis of the terrain of May 29, 2009, Annex (evidence file, folio 1267). 170 According to the information in the case file, the seven objectives that were attacked were: Objective 2: Tamboral; Objective 2: La Loma; Objective 3: Regadero; Objective 4: Bocas de Guineo; Objective 5: Teguerre; 38