127 venue, represented here by the Public Prosecutor’s Office of the Human Rights Unit whose competence was challenged, insofar as they definitely did not fulfill the constitutional functions assigned to the security forces, and these circumstances completely deny them the guarantee of military criminal jurisdiction, for which reason they may not be tried under military criminal justice; the file will therefore be forwarded to said Unit of the Public Prosecutor’s Office for appropriate action.249 204. Therefore, on February 21, 2002 the High Council of the Judiciary settled the clash of jurisdictions that had been raised, ruling that the proceedings should take place under regular criminal jurisdiction, represented by the Human Rights Unit of the Office of the Attorney General (supra para. 96.109). On June 28, 2002 the Human Rights Unit annulled the decisions of the military criminal courts and the case returned to regular courts, leaving the evidence tendered and the actions taken by said Unit untouched (supra para. 96.110). 205. The Court notes that the first attempts for the facts that took place in Mapiripán to be heard by military criminal courts go back to April 1999. At that time, the Full Court of the Constitutional Court of Colombia had ruled on the scope of competence of military criminal jurisdiction and it had stated, inter alia, that […] for a crime to fall under the competence of military criminal jurisdiction […] the punishable fact must arise from exceeding powers conferred or abuse of authority in the framework of an activity directly linked to a function that pertains directly to the armed corps. [I]f the agent has criminal intent from the start, and then uses his position to carry out the punishable act, the case falls under regular jurisdiction, even in those cases where there might be an abstract relationship between the aims of the security forces and the perpetrator’s punishable act. […T]he tie between the criminal act and the service-related activity is broken when the crime is unusually grave, as in the case of crimes against humanity. Under these circumstances, the case must be allocated to regular courts, given the total contradiction between the crime and the constitutional mandates of the security forces.250 206. The Court therefore notes that the Council of the Judiciary could have applied this jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court from the outset, since it already existed as precedent, and was reiterated in the aforementioned November 13, 2001 judgment of said court. b) Administrative-law proceedings 207. The case file before the Court shows that the next of kin of four of the victims of the Mapiripán Massacre have initiated administrative-law proceedings for direct reparation of the property-related and moral damages due to the facts, before the Administrative Court of Meta and against the Ministry of Defense, National Army. 208. In this regard, the Court views in a positive light that on February 1, 2005, the State and the next of kin of Sinaí Blanco Santamaría, Álvaro Tovar Muñoz and José Rolan Valencia reached a full friendly settlement through administrative-law proceedings (supra para. 96.130). The State pointed out that said judgments had led to res judicata. Likewise, regarding the status of said proceedings when this Judgment is issued, the Court notes that: 249 See February 21, 2002 ruling, issued by the High Council of the Judiciary (file with appendixes to the application, appendix 55, pages 853, 855 and 856). 250 See judgment C-358 of August 5, 1997, issued by the Constitutional Court.