4 of evidence in the file, the Court has reached the conclusion that the international responsibility of the State has resulted from a set of actions and omissions by State agents and private citizens, conducted in a coordinated, parallel or linked manner, with the aim of carrying out the massacre. (...) Since the acts committed by the paramilitary against the victims in the instant case cannot be considered mere acts amongst private individuals, as they are linked to actions and omissions by State officials, the State is found to be responsible for said acts, based on non-fulfillment of its erga omnes treaty obligations to ensure the effective exercise of human rights in said relations amongst individuals” (paras. 122-124). 14. There is no way to avoid finding the respondent State responsible for conduct in violation of human rights in the cas d'espèce, nor is it a matter of doing so. To attempt to do this, under the circumstances of the instant case, would involve a fruitless and in abstracto interpretive exercise, devoid of meaning and of juridical value. There is no way to avoid recognizing both the failings and omissions of the public State authorities regarding prevention and conclusive investigation of the violations committed in the instant case, and the support or collaboration provided, directly or indirectly, by public State authorities to the paramilitary, in committing grave violations of human rights under the American Convention. By finding the State internationally responsible for the above, the Court has faithfully applied the significant provisions of the American Convention on Human Rights, which constitute the applicable law in the specific case. 15. The facts are richer than the formulations of precepts, they predate the latter, and they must constantly be reformulated in light of the core principles of the law of nations, to attain the realization of justice. In conclusion, regarding the point under examination –that of attributing international responsibility to the respondent State (imputability)-, the instant case of the Mapiripán Massacre did not only involve acts by “mere private citizens” or only “tolerance” by the State. It has been proven that there was, also, an effective collaboration by the armed forces of the State with the paramilitary or “self-defense” groups, thus also involving State agents, and constituting a set of grave actions and omissions that have entailed violations of human rights in an especially cruel manner, definitively making the State internationally responsible. 16. In a country such as Colombia, with a noteworthy and respectable juridical tradition (including the sphere of International Law6), cradle of the inter-American system, it is not surprising that its own Constitutional Court –in addition do other domestic legal bodies- has espoused this same interpretation of the facts regarding the paramilitary that scourge the country, -as the Inter-American Court has appropriately recalled in the instant Judgment (paras. 118-119), which also referred to similar comments made by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights7 (para. 120). These facts are, therefore, publicly known and notorious, both domestically and internationally. . As exemplified by the successive writings, throughout the 20th century, of –for example- J.M. Yepes, F. Urrutia, J.J. Caicedo Castilla, D. Uribe Vargas, and A. Vázquez Carrizosa. 6 . Regarding the human rights situation in Colombia in the year 1997; U.N. doc. E/CN.4/1998, of 09.03.1998, paras. 29 and 91. 7