92 a) according to the Attorney General’s Office, the Colombian Army allowed the airplanes that transported said paramilitary to land, with no type of control, registration or record (supra paras. 96.30 and 96.31); b) the Colombian Army facilitated transportation of the paramilitary to Mapiripán. The paramilitary were transported from the airport in two “reo” type trucks of the type usually used by the Army, which were authorized to approach the landing strip due to a call from a person who identified himself as an officer of the “Joaquín París” battalion. The trucks went to a place near the so-called “Trocha Ganadera” [Cattle Trail] leading toward the plains and into the jungle. On the road, they were met by paramilitary from Casanare and Meta and from there they went by river, through “El Barrancón” –where the 2d Mobile Brigade and the Marine Infantry were stationed–; they continued their route unhindered to Charras, on the opposite side of the Guaviare River, in front of Mapiripán (supra para. 96.32); c) the members of the paramilitary group moved through training areas of the troops of the 2d Mobile Brigade without being stopped (supra para. 96.32). Collaboration between the members of the Army and of the AUC involved supplying stores and communications to the paramilitary (supra para. 96.35); d) the incursion of the paramilitary in Mapiripán was meticulously planned several months before July 1997, and it was carried out with logistic support and collaboration, acquiescence and omissions by members of the Army. Participation of State agents in the massacre was not restricted to facilitating entry of the AUC into the region, as the authorities were aware of the attack committed against the civilian population in Mapiripán and they did not take the necessary steps to protect the members of that community (supra para. 96.43); e) the Attorney General’s Office established that, nevertheless, in face of the arrival of the AUC, the troops of the “Joaquín París” battalion were moved from San José de Guaviare elsewhere, leaving the population in said place and in Mapiripán unprotected. Lieutenant Colonel Orozco Castro stated that when it became necessary to send military forces to Mapiripán, they had been deployed to other places such as Puerto Concordia, El Retorno and Calamar. On July 15, 1997 the last companies of the Joaquín París Battalion were ordered to go to Calamar, even though there was no confirmation of public order disturbances there. The army troop movements were unjustified and based on conjectures or mere contingencies (supra para. 96.38); f) according to the Attorney General’s Office, omissions by the VII Brigade were not merely non-fulfillment of their legal duty to control the area, but also involved “abstention, necessarily in connivance with the illegal armed group, as well as effective positive attitudes favoring attainment of the goal of the paramilitary, as undoubtedly they would not have been able to act without that assistance” (supra para. 96.44); g) members of the Army apparently took steps to cover up the facts (supra para. 96.45); and h) omissions by the VII Brigade included non-cooperation with the judicial authorities who sought to reach the place of the events (supra para. 96.46). 117. In this regard, it is pertinent to note the decisions of domestic courts regarding the criminal liability of certain members of the Armed Forces involved in the facts of the instant case. When the Constitutional Court of Colombia addressed the nature of the actions and omissions committed by some of said agents, in its ruling on the action for protection of constitutional rights filed in connection with the