48 2. Every person accused of a criminal offense has the right to be presumed innocent so long as his guilt has not been proven according to law. During the proceedings, every person is entitled, with full equality, to the following minimum guarantees: [...] d) the right of the accused to defend himself personally or to be assisted by legal counsel of his own choosing, and to communicate freely and privately with his counsel; 144. Argument of the Commission: Article 18 of Decree-Law No. 25,475 and Article 2.c of Decree-Law No. 25,744 violate one’s right to be assisted by legal counsel of one’s choosing, recognized in Article 8(2)(d) of the Convention, because they stipulate that at any given time defense lawyers may have only one case involving the crimes to which said decrees refer. While the provisions in question were amended by Decree-Law No. 26,248, the new law was not applied in the instant case; the law’s amendment “is evidence of the government’s acknowledgment of the flaws” in the amended legislation. 145. Arguments of the State: a) the alleged victims and their court-appointed attorney did participate in the police proceedings. In the presence of the military judge of inquiry, “the Chilean citizens were given the counsel of a courtappointed attorney because they stated that they had not hired private attorneys;” and b) the alleged victims “were tried in proceedings that scrupulously complied with the procedural guarantees established in Peruvian law, especially those relating to due process and the right of defense.” 146. The facts have shown that, by virtue of laws currently in effect in Peru, the victims were not allowed legal counsel between the time of their detention and the time they gave their statements to DINCOTE. Only then were they assigned courtappointed attorneys. Once the detainees had legal counsel of their choosing, the latter’s role was peripheral at best (supra 141). 147. While the law that prohibits an attorney from assisting more than one defendant at the same time does have the effect of limiting the accused’s choices of defense attorneys, it does not represent, per se, a violation of Article 8(2)(d) of the Convention. 148. However, in similar cases, where it was shown that defense attorneys had difficulty conferring in private with their clients, the Court ruled that Article 8(2)(d) of the Convention had been violated.94 149. The Court therefore finds that the State violated Article 8(2)(d) of the Convention. 94. Suárez Rosero Case, supra note 80, paras. 79 and 83.