43 a) Decree-Laws Nos. 25,475 and 25,659 were promulgated under the National Emergency and Reconstruction Government. “Subsequently, the 1993 Constitution recognized the competence of the military courts to prosecute civilians in the cases specifically listed in its Article 173.” Article 139 of the Constitution now in force in Peru establishes the independence of the courts and, by extension, the independence of the military courts. It also provides that rulings of military courts “do not apply to civilians, except in the case of the crimes of treason and terrorism that the law specifies”; b) Article 139.1 of the Constitution now in force provides that the judicial function rests entirely and exclusively with the judicial branch of government, “except in the case of military law and arbitration law.” This is consistent with Article 233 paragraph 1 of the 1979 Constitution and Article 1 of the Statute of the Judiciary. And on this basis, Article 229 of the Constitution stipulates that a law shall determine the organization and attributes of the military courts. It is thus “patently clear that Peru’s constitutions and laws have consistently provided that the military system of justice will be separate and independent”; c) the practice of trying civilians in military tribunals must be examined in light of Article 27 of the Convention, which allows states the possibility of extraordinary measures “in time of war, public danger, or other emergency that threatens the independence or security of a State Party;” d) the right to a hearing by a tribunal previously established by law implies that “the accused must be tried by judges appointed prior to the facts in the case, with the express stipulation that the individual shall be brought before a tribunal previously established by law”; it does not stipulate whether the tribunals or judges are to be military or civilian; e) to deny the validity of a military court’s ruling in the instant case would contradict the finding in the Loayza Tamayo case: If, as it did in the case of Mrs. Loayza Tamayo, the Honorable Court based its judgment on a decision handed down by military courts, mistakenly or otherwise, we believe that it would be illogical to argue in the instant case, that a judgment from those same courts is not authoritative and has no consequence in law. This would be tantamount to saying that the decisions of military courts are authoritative in some instances, provided they serve the interests that the Commission represents, but not if they are contrary to those interests. 127. The Court considers that under Peru’s Code of Military Justice, military courts are permitted to try civilians for treason, but only when the country is at war abroad. A 1992 decree-law changed this rule to allow civilians accused of treason to be tried by military courts regardless of temporal considerations. In the instant case, DINCOTE was given investigative authority, and a summary proceeding “in the theater of operations” was conducted, as stipulated in the Code of Military Justice. 128. The Court notes that several pieces of legislation give the military courts jurisdiction for the purpose of maintaining order and discipline within the ranks of the armed forces. Application of this functional jurisdiction is confined to military personnel who have committed some crime or were derelict in performing their