77 threatened the security of the State. It likewise pointed out that Law 25 was issued with a limited term of validity, that it was strictly consistent with the demands of the moment, and that it was adopted legally, since the restrictions that it established are among those authorised by the Convention, to which effect it mentioned Articles 27, 30, and 32.2 of said covenant. Lastly, it reiterated that Law 25 had been issued for general interest reasons, with the objective of safeguarding the public order and the common good. 90. In its reply brief, the Commission argued that the state of emergency was not formally declared by Panama; that it violated the principles of proportionality, proclamation and notification that govern the states of emergency, according to which the exercise of the right to suspend guarantees is limited to the existence of certain given material conditions and to compliance with precise formal requirements which, in this case, were omitted by the State; that the decision to suspend rights cannot be arbitrary and must be applied only when a less restrictive alternative does not exist; that the measures adopted by the State were illegal, since they exceeded the threats supposedly posed against the nation, for which reason the massive dismissal of public workers was unnecessary and did not correspond to the demands of the moment, and colonel Eduardo Herrera-Hassán was pardoned, which proves that Law 25 was not intended to cope with a situation of emergency, but to punish the public servants, given that regular procedures were applied to the mastermind of the coup d’état, who was pardoned, while a punitive measure was applied to the public servants through exceptional legislation and they were not pardoned. Lastly, the Commission expressed that Law 25 was incompatible with the Convention, even considering that it was issued by the Congress and was approved by the Executive Branch. 91. In its counter reply brief, Panama expressed that the events that developed in the country in December 1990 were part of a plan designed to accomplish the alteration of the State’s democratic structures, a political movement intended to subvert the constitutional order and to replace the democratic system of government with a military regime; that the public and notorious situation of emergency and the provisions of Articles 297 and 300 of the Panamanian Constitution enabled it, within the sovereign framework of the State, to issue Law 25 in use of its ruling powers; that Article 27 of the Convention was not violated, since none of the guarantees therein provided for was suspended, and that default as to notification of the state of emergency in itself has not been recognised by the Inter-American Court as a violation of the obligations of the States. 92. Article 27(3) of the American Convention, that regulates the suspension of guarantees in states of emergency establishes the indispensable requirement to immediately inform the other States Parties, through the Secretary General of the Organization of American States, of the provisions the application of which it has suspended, the reasons that gave rise to the suspension, and the date set for the termination of such suspension. 93. According to the evidence in its entirety in the instant case, it may be affirmed that the State did not inform the General Secretariat of the OAS that it would have suspended some of the guarantees established in the Convention. Mr. Guillermo Endara-Galimany, President of the Republic at the time of the events in the instant case, even stated, at the public hearing on the merits held at the seat of the Court, that “all liberties were respected […during his] Administration, […and