Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, “Protocol of San Salvador” (hereinafter “Protocol of San Salvador”), clearly defined the jurisdiction of the Commission and of the Court in relation to the subject-matter, establishing that, under the mechanism of individual petitions before the interAmerican system, only the protection of trade union rights and the right to education could be subject to analysis, but not the right to social security. The State considered that it was not acceptable to weaken the content of the provisions of Article 19(6) of the San Salvador Protocol, which was a binding standard for the organs of the system, and that the pro personae principle would only be applicable within the jurisdictional framework established by the inter-American order. 3. Furthermore, the State noted the position taken by some Judges of the Court in opposing the direct justiciability of ESCER, and expressed its agreement with that view in all respects. In this regard, it emphasized that the rights included in the protection system of the Convention were those established up to Article 25, and that although other rights and freedoms could exist, these should be included in that protection system via the mechanisms contemplated in Articles 31, 76 and 77 of the Convention. It also stressed that the Court did not have jurisdiction to add rights, only the States. It held that ESCER should not be justiciable through the direct application of Article 26 of the Convention, since that article did not enumerate a catalogue of rights, or recognize or enshrine ESCER; rather, it established the commitment of the States Parties to progressively achieve the full realization of rights that could be derived from the Charter of the Organization of American States, subject to available resources. In this sense, it argued that the obligation implicit in Article 26 that could be directly supervised by the Court was compliance with the obligation of progressive development and the duty of non-retrogression; therefore, it could not be claimed that a case concerning the alleged violation of some of the rights established in Article 26 could be submitted to this Court. It reiterated that this lack of jurisdiction was confirmed through the Protocol of San Salvador, in which the States determined that justiciability applied only in two cases, which constituted a subsequent agreement and practice among the States Parties. In addition, the State subscribed to the view that the Court could not assume jurisdiction in relation to the alleged violation of a right or freedom “not included in the Convention or in the Protocol of San Salvador” and that it was not possible to invoke the principle of progressive interpretation of international instruments in order to add rights to the protection system of the Convention, since this was being applied to attribute to an existing right that was already included in that system, a different and generally broader meaning than that originally given. 4. For its part, the Commission argued that the instant case was submitted to the Court prior to the case law advances related to Article 26 of the American Convention. Therefore, it considered that the analysis of the right to social security in the context of Article 26, in addition to the rights already invoked, “would contribute to insert it precisely in that inter-American evolution and towards a more comprehensive understanding of the scope of the international responsibility.” 5. The representatives argued that Article 26 of the Convention should be justiciable based on Article 62(3) of the Convention, which establishes the Court’s jurisdiction to hear all cases concerning the interpretation and application of the provisions of the Convention that are submitted to it, and that the aforementioned provision was part of the treaty. Likewise, they indicated that the violation of the Protocol of San Salvador had not been invoked, but that its mention was by way of illustration, since it formed part of the inter-American corpus juris that could be used as a parameter for interpreting the Convention. Finally, they concluded that “the right to social security is a human right protected by international law and implicit in Article 26 of the Convention.” 6. In this regard, it should be recalled that preliminary objections are objections to the admissibility of an application or the jurisdiction of the Court to hear a specific case or any of its aspects, owing to the person, the issue, the time or the place, provided that those assertions are