13. Furthermore, she alleges the violation of the right set forth in Article 8.2 (h) of the American Convention, since in the assessment of the appeal filed on November 19, 1999, the Second Chamber of the Chamber of Criminal Appeals did not analyze the merits of the matter, after which the accused was left in a state of defenselessness. Lastly, the petitioner alleges the violation of the right set forth in Article 8.2 (e) of the American Convention, on the grounds that the official defender appointed before the National Chamber of Criminal Appeals did not use the necessary and adequate procedures to comply with the accused’s intent of appealing the judgement by the Second Chamber confirming the verdict against him. 14. Based on the foregoing, the petitioner argues that to the detriment of the alleged victim, the State violated the rights set forth in Articles 8.1, 8.2 (c), (d), (e), (f), (g) and (h), and 11.1, all of which are in agreement with Article 1.1 of the American Convention on Human Rights. B. Position of the State 15. According to the State, the petition must be dismissed, as it was referred to the State seven years after it was lodged with the Commission. 16. The State alleges that the decision of keeping Mr. Álvarez handcuffed was based on the information provided by the special security forces that guard accused persons and who deemed the measure necessary due to his several runaway attempts in co-occurrence with criminal assault. The State alleges that said decision was made through a completely independent procedure and that it cannot be seen as a prejudgment about the presumption of innocence. It also argues that the decision made at the hearing was objected via a complaint appeal filed by the alleged victim’s defense and subjected to the court’s decision. 17. It alleges that the appointment of a public defender by the Oral Juvenile Court No. 1 sought to safeguard the rights to legal representation and a fair trial in favor of Mr. Álvarez. It states that such appointment was made only when the alleged victim had rescinded the power granted to counsels of his own choosing on a date very close to the one set for the beginning of the hearing; so, the State ensured that the accused had an adequate defense throughout the hearing. 18. The State informs that the appointment of a public defender was a subsidiary and emergency measure to ensure that the hearing was held under normal conditions and in conformity with legal safeguards. It says that Mr. Álvarez used his right to rescind the powers of attorney more than once, before and after the hearing; therefore, the State did not violate this right. 19. It argues that the public defender, who is alleged not to have had enough time to prepare the defense for the alleged victim, had previously been acquainted with the criminal case in which the criminal facts were investigated; and that consequently, she did not fully ignore Mr. Álvarez’s situation. It affirms that under the Argentine Criminal Code of Procedure, the situation alleged by the petitioner is not a reason for the postponement of the hearing. 20. The State alleges that the complexity of the hearing must be taken into account, as it was a procedural stage involving numerous individuals, “such as accused persons, witnesses, prosecutors, expert witnesses, etc.” and was decided to be held throughout 11 days, “along with the delays that the change of any of those dates could have caused.” Concerning the petitioner’s allegations about the inability to use the necessary judicial remedies, it says that “all the remedies filed by Álvarez’s representatives were duly assessed and processed,” and that if the petition is admitted, there would be “another stage of review about matters that are out of the Commission’s competence”. 21. To conclude, the State argues that given that the facts alleged do not tend to establish a violation of the rights protected by the American Convention on Human Rights, the petition is inadmissible and requests the IACHR to follow suit. IV. ANALYSIS ON COMPETENCE AND ADMISSIBILITY 3