took into consideration a series of psychological reports which it ordered to determine the girls’ psychological and emotional status235. 203. In this regard, the Court finds that the first instance court in the custody proceeding complied with the obligations arising from the child’s right to be heard in a judicial proceeding that affects them, since it is clearly stated that the views of the three girls were taken into account, bearing in mind their maturity and capacity at that time. 204. On the other hand, the Court notes that there is no evidence in the custody case file stating that the girls were heard again by the Supreme Court of Justice of Chile in the context of the decision on the remedy of complaint, nor is there any mention in the ruling issued by the Supreme Court regarding the decision to set aside the wishes expressed by the girls during the proceedings. 205. In the present case, the Court takes note of the unique nature of the remedy of complaint, which is mainly a disciplinary recourse against lower court judges and in which no evidence other than at already presented during the entire custody hearing is gathered (supra para. 185). Likewise, this Court cautions that a child must not be interviewed more often than necessary, particularly when disturbing events are investigated, since the process of “hearing” a child may be difficult and may cause traumatic effects in the child236. Therefore, the Court does not consider that the Supreme Court needed to hold a new hearing in the context of the decision on the remedy of complaint to hear the girls express their preferences regarding which parent they would rather live with, if there were already several pieces of evidence in the custody case file that confirmed their wishes. 206. However, the fact that a judicial authority is not required to gather the testimony of a child once again in the context of a judicial proceeding, does not release it from the obligation to duly consider and assess, in one way or another, the views expressed by the child in the lower courts, according to the child’s age and maturity. If appropriate, the respective judicial authority must argue specifically why it will not take into account the child’s views. In this regard, the expert García Méndez stated that: In any type of conflict between children’s views and those of the parental authority or institutional authorities, […] the child’s opinion cannot be thrown out discretionally. In other words, this means that […] very sophisticated arguments must be developed to eventually oppose the children’s views. [T]he child’s opinion does not automatically create case law […]. But similarly, the child’s views cannot be automatically disregarded without offering weighty and profound arguments 237. 207. Likewise, the expert Cillero Bruñol stated that: [There is] an obligation [on the part of the state authorities] to consider their opinion in deliberations that lead to a decision that affects children. […] [T]he adults responsible for the decision must not decide arbitrarily when the child says something relevant to the decision […]. […] If the children are sufficiently developed in their opinions and points of view, these must prevail in matters affecting them, unless there are very serious reasons against them. This means that if the children’s opinions are well-based, precise, with sufficient knowledge of the facts and the consequences they imply, they must prima facie prevail over other arguments to determine the decision that will affect the child in what refers to the facts and states that involve him. This priority is demanded by the principle of the best interest of the child of Article 3 of the [Convention on the Rights of the Child]. The foregoing does not mean that the determination of the child’s best interest is always going to coincide in the specific case with the child’s opinions, even when 235 Cf. Judgment of the Juvenile Court of Villarrica of October 29, 2003, considering clause No. 36 (record of appendices to the petition, volume V, page 2589). 236 Cf. Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 12, supra note 218, para. 24. 237 Statement by expert García Méndez at the hearing in the present case held on August 23, 2011. 64