27. Likewise, the Human Rights Committee, in its General Comment on Right to equality before courts and tribunals and to a fair trial,” stated that: 21. The requirement of impartiality has two aspects. First, judges must not allow their judgement to be influenced by personal bias or prejudice, nor harbour preconceptions about the particular case before them, nor act in ways that improperly promote the interests of one of the parties to the detriment of the other. Second, the tribunal must also appear to a reasonable observer to be impartial. For instance, a trial substantially affected by the participation of a judge who, under domestic statutes, should have been disqualified cannot normally be considered to be impartial.35 28. In addition, the ECHR has underscored that, in order to prove that there has been a violation of the right to an impartial judge, it is not sufficient to make an analysis in abstract and a priori and, especially, a general analysis; rather, it is essential to analyze each specific case.36 29. Also, in the European sphere it has been determined that States parties are obliged to organize their legal system so as to ensure compliance with the requirements of Article 6.1 of the European Convention.37 30. In summary, the analysis of an alleged lack of judicial impartiality may include, on the one hand, the sphere of functional impartiality which refers to aspects such as the functions assigned to the judge within the judicial proceedings.38 Then, on the other hand, there is the aspect of personal impartiality, which refers to the conduct of the judge in relation to a specific case. The European Court of Human Rights has indicated that these aspects of impartiality may be analyzed from a subjective point of view (subjective test) or from an objective point of view (objective test). The question of the personal aspect of impartiality may be assessed by both tests and the question of the functional aspect of impartiality may be analyzed from the objective viewpoint. The Inter-American Court has stipulated that recusal is a procedural instrument that objective test; that is, determining whether a judge offers sufficient guarantees to exclude any legitimate doubt in this regard. Personal impartiality may be presumed, unless there is proof to the contrary. Under the objective test, it should be considered whether, over and above the personal conduct of the judge, there are certain facts that could raise doubts about his impartiality. In this regard, even appearances could have a certain importance. What is at stake is the confidence that the courts should inspire in a democratic society in the population and, above all, in the case of criminal proceedings, in the accused. This means that, in order to examine whether a specific judge lacks impartiality, the point of view of the accused is important, although not decisive. The significant factor is whether the misgivings can be considered objectively justified. García Roca, Javier and Vidal Zapatero, José Miguel, op. cit. p. 382 and 383. 35 Human Rights Committee, General comment No. 32. Article 14. Right to equality before courts and tribunals and to a fair trial, ninetieth session, Geneva, 9 to 27 July 2007 36 García Roca, Javier and Vidal Zapatero, José Miguel, op. cit. p. 385. 37 ECHR. Case of Guincho v. Portugal, Judgment (Merits and Just Satisfaction, Court (Chamber), Application. 8990/8Judgment of 10 July 1984, para.38. 38 In this regard, see: ECHR, Case of Kyprianou v. Cyprus, Judgment (Merits and Just Satisfaction), Court (Grand Chamber), Application No. 73797/01), Judgment of 15 December 2005, para. 121: “An analysis of the Courts case law discloses two possible situations in which the question of a lack of judicial impartiality arises. The first is functional in nature: where the judge’s personal conduct is not at all impugned, but where for instance, the exercise of different functions within the judicial process by the same person (see Piersack, cited above), or hierarchical or other links with another actor in the proceedings […] objectively justify misgivings as to the impartiality of the Tribunal, which thus fails to meet the Convention standard under the objective test […]. The second is of a personal character and derives from the conduct of the judges in a given case. […]”. 9