17. Second, we should not lose sight of the European Court’s findings in a similar case to this one. 19 In this situation, it noted that “the mere fact that a trial judge or an appeal judge […] has also made pre-trial decisions in the case, including those concerning detention on remand, cannot be held as in itself justifying fears as to his impartiality.” 20 Thus, it asserted that: The application of the [law regulating the admissibility of detention on remand) requires, inter alia, that the judge be satisfied that there is a "particularly confirmed suspicion" that the accused has committed the crime(s) with which he is charged. This wording has been officially explained as meaning that the judge has to be convinced that there is "a very high degree of clarity" as to the question of guilt […]. Thus, the difference between the issue the judge has to settle when applying this section and the issue he will have to settle when giving judgment at the trial becomes tenuous. The Court is therefore of the view that in the circumstances of the case the impartiality of the said tribunals was capable of appearing to be open to doubt and that the applicant’s fears in this respect can be considered objectively justified.21 18. Based on those arguments, the European Court considered that there had been a violation of the right to be heard by an impartial court, as established in Article 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights. 22 This matter is very similar to the judgment that is the subject of this opinion. Thus, the judge’s satisfaction referred to in the European Court’s judgment regarding the existence of “a very high degree of clarity” as to guilt, when ordering pre-trial detention, is an aspect that is also present in the facts of the Scot Cochran case. Indeed, in the instant case, when the judge of appeal decided on the extension of the precautionary measure, he explicitly considered that: “… regarding the evidence proving the charges, this case has sufficient evidence that at least supports a strong probability of the participation of the accused Scott Cochran in these facts.” 23 19. Accordingly, as is clear from the factual framework and indicated in the judgment of the Inter-American Court, when issuing the order for pre-trial detention, “the judge considered that there was the required degree of probability that Scot Cochran was the author of the wrongful act attributed to him, because the Judicial Investigation Department had conducted a series of procedures and received witness statements to this effect.” 24 Consequently, as in the case heard by the European Court, the distinction between what was decided by the judge in the context of pre-trial detention (either initially, in the context of a review and extension of the pre-trial detention, or in the context of an eventual appeal) and the matter that had to be decided when handing down a judgment in the main trial becomes tenuous. This issue becomes more relevant, especially given the existence of probative elements gathered during the investigation stage relating to Scot Cochran’s participation in the wrongful act. 20. The foregoing also reveals the insufficiency of the second argument; that, since the vote was unanimous and the court was collegiate, the result would also have been a conviction. 25 In this context, it is necessary to recall our observation in the first section of this opinion; that the central purpose of objective impartiality is to eliminate any doubt that the defendant or the community could have as to the absence of impartiality. 26 Thus, it is difficult to inspire adequate confidence in the system of justice if, at the same time, the possible flawed 19 We are grateful to Esteban Oyarzún for his contribution as research assistant for this opinion. 20 Cf. ECHR, Hauschildt v. Denmark, supra, para. 50. 21 ECHR, Hauschildt v. Denmark, supra, para. 52. 22 Cf. ECHR, Hauschildt v. Denmark, supra, para. 53. Ruling No. 235-03 of the Criminal Trial Court of the First Judicial Circuit of San José of August 11, 2003, signed by Judge LGBG, confirming the decision appealed against (evidence file, folios 55 to 58). 23 24 Paragraph 53. 25 Cf. Paragraph 123. 26 Cf. Case of Apitz Barbera et al. (“First Court of Administrative Disputes”) v. Venezuela, supra, para. 56. 4