composition of a jurisdictional organ is not challenged on the grounds that, anyway, “the result would have been a conviction.” 21. When examining objective impartiality, the European Court has indicated that, when doubt exists as to the lack of impartiality of one of the judges who composes a court, in view of the secrecy of the deliberations, it is impossible to ascertain a judge’s actual influence in that context. 27 Therefore, “the impartiality of that court could be open to genuine doubt,” 28 and this led that court to conclude that there had been a violation of Article 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights. 29 Consequently, in such contextual circumstances, similar to those of the instant case, any reasonable observer would consider that a judge who had decided aspects related to pre-trial detention and had, subsequently, ruled on the merits of the same case, would inevitably inspire legitimate misgivings in the defendant regarding the guarantee of the court’s impartiality. Moreover, it goes without saying that, during the deliberations, each member of the court sets out reasons aimed at persuading the other members in one way or the other so that the final decision is the best and most appropriate for the case in question. Judges do not act as separate entities in sealed compartments. The decision taken as a result of the deliberations is an act that is the outcome of dialogic reasoning and, due to its nature, this is collective. Consequently, it is not enough to eliminate the judge implicated to automatically deduce that the opinion of that judge had no impact on the decision of the majority. It is precisely because the final ruling is the result of a decision of the court as a whole, adopted in the context of secret deliberations, that it is not possible to identify and isolate the influence of the opinion of one of the judges. Asserting the contrary would mean ignoring the value, importance and impact of this collegiate procedure. 22. Lastly, regarding the third argument, the Court indicated that “even though the possibility of filing a challenge was available at the time of the facts, this was not filed against Judge LGBG during the criminal proceedings that culminated in the guilty verdict […] rather, it was submitted for the first time during the third review procedure, [in which it was] found that there was no suspicion of partiality because there was no evidence that the judge had assessed the body of evidence when deciding the appeal against pre-trial detention.” 30 23. Here, we consider it necessary to recall the Inter-American Court’s considerations in relation to the mechanism of challenge: [T]he Court considers that the mechanism granting the right to challenge judges has a twofold purpose; on one hand, it works as a guarantee for the parties to the proceedings, and on the other hand, it aims at providing credibility to the role performed by the jurisdiction. Indeed, challenging gives the parties the right to move for the exclusion of a judge when, regardless of the personal conduct of the questioned judge, there are proven facts or convincing elements that lead to grounds for misgivings or legitimate suspicions regarding his partiality, thus impeding his decision from being seen as made based on reasons in conformity with the law; therefore, the functioning of the judicial system is distorted. Challenging should not necessarily be seen as a judgment on the moral rectitude of the challenged official, but rather as a tool to build trust in those resorting to the State for the intervention of bodies that are and appear to be impartial. 31 24. Despite the foregoing, we should not forget that, in addition to the possibility of 27 Cf. ECHR, Case of Otegi Mondragon and Others v. Spain, nos. 4184/15, Judgment of November 6, 2018, para. 67. 28 ECHR, Case of Otegi Mondragon and Others v. Spain, supra, para. 67. 29 Cf. ECHR, Case of Otegi Mondragon and Others v. Spain, supra, para. 69. 30 Paragraph 124. Case of Apitz Barbera et al. (“First Court of Administrative Disputes”) v. Venezuela, supra, para. 63; Case of López Lone et al. v. Honduras. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of October 5, 2015. Series C No. 302, para. 224. 31 5