procedural subjects availing themselves of challenges in the case of a possible situation of lack of impartiality, this guarantee must be respected by judges or judicial authorities ex officio. 32 Thus, “the judge or court must withdraw from a case submitted to their consideration when there is some reason or doubt that has an adverse impact on the integrity of the court as an impartial body.” 33 25. The foregoing is in keeping with the assertion of the European Court that “even appearances may be of a certain importance. What is at stake is the confidence which the courts in a democratic society must inspire in the public, including the accused. Accordingly, any judge in respect of whom there is a legitimate reason to fear a lack of impartiality must withdraw.” 34 26. In this regard, European case law has added that “it is the responsibility of the individual judge to identify any impediments to his or her participation and either to withdraw or, when faced with a situation in which it is arguable that he or she should be disqualified, although not unequivocally excluded by law, to bring the matter to the attention of the parties in order to allow them to challenge the participation of the judge.” 35 27. Consequently, in this specific case, above all, it was incumbent on the judges or judicial authorities involved in deciding the matter to refrain from hearing it or to inform those intervening in it of the possibility of challenging their participation in the clear existence of reasonable doubts about a lack of impartiality. This, in order to crystallize the necessary trust that the administration of justice must instill in procedural subjects and in the general public. III. Final considerations 28. The foregoing reasons show that, by failing to take measures to avoid the same judge being involved in the pre-trial stage of the wrongful act and Scot Cochran’s participation in this and, subsequently, being called on to decide on his guilt during the criminal trial, the State violated the guarantee of the impartiality of the court recognized in Article 8(1) of the American Convention. Indeed, in this case, the judge who decided the appeal, confirming the continuation of pre-trial detention, clearly considered the existence of evidence gathered during the investigation stage related to Scot Cochran’s participation in the wrongful act. Evidently this makes the distinction between the elements taken into account when deciding on the precautionary measure and those assessed to deliver the judgment on the merits extremely tenuous. 29. It is not correct to found the decision not to declare this violation on the precedent in Amrhein et al. v. Costa Rica because, on November 7, 2022, the Court re-evaluated the said criterion in Tzompaxtle Tecpile et al. v. Mexico indicating that the judges who hear the precautionary measures and those who hear the merits of a case should be different. 30. The preceding conclusion is supported by the fact that the judgment recommends that, “owing to the situation [that a same judge had taken part in the decision on pre-trial detention and on the merits of the case], the State should take the necessary measures to further 32 Cf. Case of Palamara Iribarne v. Chile. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of November 22, 2005. Series C No. 135, para. 147. 33 Case of Palamara Iribarne v. Chile, supra, para. 147. ECHR Castillo Algar v. Spain, no. 28194/95, Judgment of October 28, 1998, para. 45. Similarly: ECHR Škrlj v. Croatia, no. 32953/13, of July 11, 2019, para. 43. 34 35 ECHR Sigríður Elín Sigfúsdóttir v. Iceland, no. 41382/17, Judgment of February 25, 2020, para. 35. 6