4 III. THE PARTIES’ POSITIONS A. The petitioners 26. The petitioners allege that on September 15, 1992, José Luis García Ibarra, a 16 year-old child, was shot dead without provocation, by police officer Guillermo Segundo Cortez Escobedo, in the Codesa neighborhood of the city of Esmeraldas. 27. They pointed out that according to the statements of witnesses, the alleged victim was some 32 meters from his home, talking to friends, when a young man named Segundo Mosquera –who had recently undergone surgery- walked up to chat with them. According to the petitioners, it was at this moment that police officer Segundo Guillermo Cortez Escobeda arrived on the scene, intoxicated, in uniform and carrying his police-issued firearm. The petitioners noted that when the police officer recognized young Mosquera as someone with an alleged criminal record, he proceeded to beat him. The petitioners observed that when this happened, the boys who were present –José Luís García Ibarra among them- attempted to stand up, at which point the police officer fired his weapon and killed García Ibarra outright. 28. As for the admissibility and competence requirements, the petitioners asserted that the facts of the case occurred within the territory of the Republic of Ecuador, a State party to the American Convention since December 28, 1977. As for the Commission’s competence ratione materiae, they argued that the actions and omissions committed by a police officer and by members of the justice system, respectively, constituted violations of the American Convention. 29. As for the rule requiring exhaustion of local remedies, the petitioners observed that the State was guilty of an unwarranted delay in reaching a final verdict in the criminal case prosecuted in the domestic courts. They pointed out that the case law of the organs of the inter-American system and of the United Nations Human Rights Committee has established that a delay in the proceedings is counted from the start of the case up through the final definitive verdict, and includes any motions and appeals that may be filed. They noted that on September 23, 1992, the First Police Precinct began the investigation, and the final verdict in the case was delivered on February 26, 2002, with the decision that the Second Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice delivered on the cassation appeal filed in the case. In other words, the criminal case took nine years and five months, which the petitioners contend is proof of an unwarranted delay in rendering a final judgment in the case. 30. As for the rule requiring that the petition be filed within the prescribed period, the petitioners argue that it was filed on November 24, 1994, two years after the events. By that time, no lower-court ruling had as yet been delivered in the case. Based on the foregoing, the petitioners argue that the six-month time period is not prescribed in this case since the exceptions to the rule requiring exhaustion of domestic remedies apply. 31. Finally, the petitioners contend that this case is not pending with another international proceeding for settlement and does not essentially duplicate a petition pending or already examined and settled by the Commission or by another international governmental organization. 32. As for the State’s fourth-instance argument, the petitioners make the point that they were not asking the Commission to review a judgment delivered in a domestic court; instead, their objective was to prove that the State violated the right to independent and impartial courts and the