established, if two different norms are applicable to a situation, the one most favorable to the individual should prevail.” 405 D. The decriminalization of defamation and the conclusion of the punishment In the instant case, Messrs. Mémoli were convicted of the offense of defamation defined in article 110 of the Criminal Code in force at the time, which was later annulled by Law No. 26,551, promulgated on November 26, 2009, which amended the definition of defamation as a crime, based on which the presumed victims in this case were convicted. 406 Consequently, consistent with the preceding considerations on public interest and on the case law of the Court itself, the new definition of the offense of defamation should have been applied to Messrs. Mémoli, inasmuch as statements related to matters of public interest and also those that are not affirmative – in other words, opinions – were decriminalized. Hence, on both counts, the new definition of the offense of defamation was applicable to the sentence imposed on Messrs. Mémoli. Furthermore, with regard to the supposed conclusion of the punishment, it is important to underscore, on the one hand, that currently a civil action for damages is ongoing against Messrs. Mémoli, which is based precisely on the criminal convictions imposed on them 407 and, on the other hand, that the State itself has indicated that “the civil action [in which a complaint has been filed against Messrs. Mémoli] is a direct consequence of the criminal proceeding” and that, in the civil action, it is not possible to litigate “matters that have already been decided in the criminal proceeding.” 408 Therefore, even though the criminal sanctions of one and five months’ imprisonment imposed on Carlos and Pablo Mémoli, respectively, could now be concluded, this conviction continues to have legal effects for them. In this regard, it is also pertinent to emphasize the decision of the National Criminal Cassation Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation when deciding the appeal for review of the sentence imposed on Mr. Kimel. In this decision, the National Criminal Cassation Chamber expressly established that “the conclusion of the sentence does not prevent the review of a conviction, because in order to safeguard the honor and patrimony of the individual convicted, the law enables his or her spouse, siblings, children and […] parents to file an action.” 409 The State itself provided this decision to the file of this case. In the Kimel case, when reviewing the criminal conviction imposed on the victim, it was found that it had been concluded and no decisions were pending in any civil proceeding related to the said criminal conviction. Despite this, based merely on the stigmatization associated with criminal sanctions and the protection of the victim��s honor and reputation, the Supreme para. 37; Case of Baena Ricardo et al. v. Panama. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of February 2, 2001. Series C No. 72, para. 189, and Case of Herrera Ulloa v. Costa Rica, supra, para. 184. 405 Case of Ricardo Canese v. Paraguay, supra, para. 181. 406 The new article 110 of the Argentine Criminal Code establishes that: “[a]nyone who intentionally dishonors or discredits a particular individual shall be punished by a fine of one thousand five hundred pesos ($ 1,500) to twenty thousand pesos ($ 20,000). In no instance shall expressions referring to matters of public interest or those that are not affirmative constitute the offense of defamation. Nor shall words harmful to honor constitute the offense of defamation when they are relevant to a matter of public interest.” 407 Paras. 95 and ff. of the Judgment. 408 Answering brief (merits file, folio 231). 409 Judgment of the National Criminal Cassation Chamber of November 10, 2011, deciding the appeal for review in the Kimel case (file of annexes to the answering brief, annex III, folio 2870). 11