penalties to achieve this objective. 243 The need to protect the rights that could be affected by an abusive exercise of freedom of expression calls for due observance of the limits established by the Convention in this regard. 244 The settlement of a dispute between both rights requires weighing them based on a judgment of proportionality and, to this end, each case must be examined taking into account its characteristics and circumstances, in order to assess the existence and intensity of the elements on which this judgment is based. 245 128. The Court will now examine the compatibility with the American Convention of the subsequent imposition of liability on Messrs. Mémoli, taking into account the above-mentioned standards. A.2.2) The subsequent imposition of liability in this case 129. Based on some arguments of the representatives, this Court observes that, when examining the above-mentioned public interventions by means of newspaper articles or radio programs, it is not required to analyze whether Messrs. Mémoli effectively committed the offense of defamation against the members of the Management Committee of the Italian Association. This falls within the competence of the domestic courts. What corresponds to this Court is the examination of whether, when subsequently imposing liability on Messrs. Mémoli for the exercise of their freedom of expression, the State respected and guaranteed the relevant Convention-based requirements. 130. In this regard, Article 13(2) of the American Convention establishes that the subsequent imposition of liability for the exercise of freedom of expression must comply with all the following requirements: (i) it must be expressly established by law, in both the formal and substantial sense; 246 (ii) it must respond to an objective permitted by the American Convention (“respect for the rights or reputations of others” or “the protection of national security, public order, or public health or morals”), and (iii) it must be necessary in a democratic society (and to this end must comply with the requirements of suitability, necessity and proportionality). 247 In this case, the Court will analyze whether the sentences for defamation imposed on Messrs. Mémoli met these requirements. 131. The Court recalls that Carlos and Pablo Mémoli were convicted in the criminal jurisdiction to a suspended sentence of one and five months’ imprisonment, respectively, for the offense of defamation owing to statements made in seven interventions that both the first instance court and the chamber of second instance considered to have denigrated or discredited the honor or the reputation of the complainants. At the same time, Messrs. Mémoli were acquitted of the offense of defamation for the other interventions of which they had been accused, as well as for the offense of libel for all the interventions for which they had been criminally prosecuted (supra paras. 75 to 88). 132. Regarding the first requirement of Article 13(2) of the Convention (established by law), the Court observes that, in this case, Messrs. Mémoli were convicted of the offense of 243 Cf. Case of Kimel v. Argentina, supra, para. 75, and Case of Fontevecchia and D’Amico v. Argentina, supra, para. 50. 244 Cf. Case of Kimel v. Argentina, supra, para. 56, and Case of Fontevecchia and D’Amico v. Argentina, supra, para. 50. 245 Cf. Case of Kimel v. Argentina, supra, para. 51. 246 Cf. The Word “Laws” in Article 30 of the American Convention on Human Rights. Advisory opinion OC-6/86 of May 9, 1986. Series A No. 6, paras. 35 and 37. 247 Cf. Case of Tristán Donoso v. Panama, supra, para. 56. 52