United States dollars) for loss of earnings “owing to the harm caused to his professional activity as a lawyer,” as well as the impossibility of having a radio license, owing to the criminal conviction and because the general injunction on property made it “impossible to sell radio spots to different Government agencies that required the corresponding documentation.” With regard to Carlos Mémoli, they requested, as consequential damages, the sum of US$30,000.00 (thirty thousand United States dollars), “for the financial effort involved in taking on this litigation [and] for the smear campaign that he suffered”; while, for loss of earnings, they requested the sum of US$30,000.00 (thirty thousand United States dollars), for the restrictions on the use and enjoyment of his property. 212. The State asked that “this Court take into account the international standards and the parameters established in its consistent case law and reject these excessive pecuniary claims.” In addition, it indicated that “the presumed victims have not presented sufficient evidence to justify the elevated amounts requested as compensation for pecuniary damage, but merely made general affirmations.” Regarding the arguments concerning loss of earnings, the State argued that “it is totally inexact that Mr. Mémoli did not exercise the profession [of lawyer] and that he is unable to exercise his profession as a journalist under equal legal conditions” and, if the representatives’ assertion is accepted, it would lead to the conclusion that “lawyers who are exercising their profession cannot handle more than one case.” 213. In its case law, the Court has developed the concept of pecuniary damage and has established that it supposes “the loss of or detriment to the income of the victims, the expenses incurred as a result of the facts, and the consequences of a pecuniary nature that have a causal nexus with the facts of the case.” 340 In the instant case, the representatives’ arguments concerning pecuniary damage can be classified as the loss of earnings of Messrs. Mémoli and the losses that the general injunction on property caused to Carlos Mémoli. The other arguments mentioned will be analyzed in the sections relating to non-pecuniary damage or to costs and expenses, as appropriate. 214. The criterion of equity has been used in this Court’s case law to quantify nonpecuniary damage 341 and pecuniary damage. 342 Nevertheless, this Court draws attention to the fact that the use of this criterion does not mean that the Court can act discretionally when establishing compensatory amounts. 343 It is for the parties to provide clear evidence of the losses suffered, as well as the specific relationship of the pecuniary claim to the facts of the case and the alleged violations. 344 215. Regarding loss of earning, the Court observes that the representatives merely argued that Pablo Mémoli’s income had been harmed by the impact that managing the case had had on his career as a lawyer, as well as owing to the supposed impediments that this represented to obtaining a radio license. This Court considers that the representatives did not provide evidence that would allow it to verify the alleged losses. 340 Case of Bámaca Velásquez v. Guatemala. Reparations and costs. Judgment of February 22, 2002. Series C No. 91, para. 43, and Case of Suárez Peralta v. Ecuador, supra, para. 212. 341 Cf. Case of Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras. Reparations and costs, supra, para. 27, and Case of Artavia Murillo et al. (In vitro fertilization) v. Costa Rica, supra, para. 352. 342 Cf. Case of Neira Alegría et al. v. Peru. Reparations and costs, supra, para. 50, and Case of Artavia Murillo et al. (In vitro fertilization) v. Costa Rica, supra, para. 352. 343 Cf. Case of Aloeboetoe et al. v. Suriname. Reparations and costs. Judgment of September 10, 1993. Series C No. 15, para. 87, and Case of Artavia Murillo et al. (In vitro fertilization) v. Costa Rica, supra, para. 352. 344 Cf. Case of Atala Riffo and Daughters v. Chile, supra, para. 291, and Case of Artavia Murillo et al. (In vitro fertilization) v. Costa Rica, supra, para. 352. 77