It should also be noted that the State’s system of justice considered the statements defamatory without distinguishing whether they were factual affirmations, the truth or inaccuracy of which would thus be verifiable, or mere opinions which, to the contrary, cannot be verified. From the foregoing, it is possible to understand, on the one hand, that the statements in question were made at the time of the said criminal proceeding or related to the same facts that were disputed in this proceeding and referred to facts or circumstances that fall within what the Court’s case law has referred to in terms of “[f]or the ordinary citizen awareness of the opinions of others or the information they may have is as important as the right to disseminate his or her own opinion.” 382 3. Plausible motive Likewise, as part of the context and in order to determine the need for the said sanctions decided by the domestic jurisdiction, it is necessary to consider (which was not done in these proceedings either) the fact that, in the judicial decision of June 6, 1990, confirmed in second instance on June 13, 1990, and which dismissed the said proceeding for lack of sufficient merits, it was established that the above-mentioned sales contract for the burial niches had an “impossible purpose” and was, therefore, “invalid,” so that the domestic court itself recorded “that, in future, by mutual agreement, the deal should be structured legally.” 383 In other words, this reveals that, despite the dismissal decided in the domestic proceeding, there was a plausible motive for filing the complaint that originated this and that, consequently, it truly constituted the exercise of a right and even compliance with a duty and, in any case, did not violate the provisions of Article 11 of the Convention. D. Public interest 1. According to case law However, the weighing up referred to above must include also and in a relevant way, especially in cases such as this, what is understood by public interest, because the Court itself has indicated this. Indeed, the Court has stated that “the legality of the restrictions to freedom of expression based on Article 13(2) will depend on them being designed to satisfy an essential public interest”; that “[a]mong the different options to achieve this objective, the one that restricts the protected right the least must be chosen,” and that “the restriction must be proportionate to the interest that justifies it and be closely adapted to the achievement of this legitimate objective.” 384 The Judgment adds that “the Court has considered of public interest opinions or information on matters in which the Association had a legitimate interest to keep itself informed, to know what had an impact on the functioning of the State, or affected general rights or interests, or 382 Case of Ivcher Bronstein v. Peru. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of February 6, 2001. Series C No. 74, para. 148, and Case of Vélez Restrepo and family members v. Colombia, supra, para. 138. 383 Para. 70 of the Judgment. Compulsory Membership in an Association Prescribed by Law for the Practice of Journalism (Arts. 13 and 29 American Convention on Human Rights), supra; Case of Herrera Ulloa v. Costa Rica, supra, para. 123, and Case of Usón Ramírez v. Venezuela, supra, para. 79. 384 7