7 1982) and Efraín Ríos Montt (1982-1983). This became the most violent period of the armed conflict.4 In ethnic terms, the members of the Mayan indigenous people accounted for 83% of the conflict’s victims.5 38. During the period of internal armed conflict, the so-called National Security Doctrine6 was applied, which was adopted by the governments and armed forces of various countries in the Americas back in the 1960s as a response to the actions and rhetoric of insurgent movements. During the period of the armed conflict in Guatemala, the notion of an “enemy within”, a central tenet of that doctrine, was used more and more. In its investigation, the CEH concluded that in application of the National Security Doctrine, the forces of the State and their collaborators -civil self-defense patrolswere responsible for 93% of the human rights violations documented during the armed conflict.7 39. Here it is important to note that in March 1982, as a result of a coup d’etat, a military governing junta was installed, headed by José Efraín Ríos Montt and formed by General Horacio Maldonado Schaad and Colonel Francisco Luis Gordillo Martínez. That military junta was the highest authority in the Republic of Guatemala until June 8 of that year, when Ríos Montt8 assumed the offices of President of the Republic and Minister of National Defense. Ríos Monta remained as de facto president until August 31, 1983.9 40. The Military Junta and High Command devised and ordered implementation of a military campaign plan called “Victoria 82”, using new strategic definitions couched within the framework of the counterinsurgency and objectives of the National Security and Development Plan.10 41. In 1982, the Army implemented the National Security and Development Plan and the Military Plan Victoria 82; both were especially targeted at the guerrillas in the northwestern and northern regions of Guatemala. Appendix H of the National Security and Development Plan spells out the need to deny subversives access to the population that is their social and political base and singles out the following tactics to be used against the guerrilla movement: deceive them, discover them, attack them and annihilate them. The CEH concluded that ‘the mission is to annihilate the guerrilla movement 4 I/A Court H.R., Case of the Dos Erres Massacre v. Guatemala. Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 24, 2009. Series C No. 211, paragraph 71; IACHR, Annual Report 1983-1984, Chapter IV, September 28, 1984. Available at: http://www.IACHR.org/annualrep/83.84.eng/toc.htm. 5 Annex 1. CEH, Memory of Silence, Volume V, Conclusions and Recommendations, paragraph 1. See also, I/A Court H.R., Case of Tiu Tojín v. Guatemala. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 26, 2008. Series C No. 190, paragraph 48. 6 The CEH observed that the National Security Doctrine was a practical way to deal, either externally or internally, with the possible or real Communist threat within the context of the Cold War and the new relations between the United States and Latin America. In Guatemala, this concept meant that all structures of the State and all resources of power had to be put in the hands of the Army to combat and defeat the guerrilla movement, understood broadly as the enemy within. Annex 1. CEH, Memory of Silence, Volume V, Conclusions and Recommendations, paragraphs 14-15, 83-84. 7 Annex 1. CEH, Memory of Silence, Volume V, Conclusions and Recommendations, par. 82. 8 José Efraín Ríos Montt assumed the executive and legislative functions of the State as President of the Republic and Commander General of the Army, with the authorities functions and pre-eminence that Decree Law 24-83 conferred upon the Military Governing Junta by virtue of Decree Law 36-82. 9 See, inter alia, IACHR, Report on the situation of human rights in Guatemala, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.61 doc 47, approved on October 3, 1983, Introduction “The coup d’état of March 23, 1982”. Available at: http://www.IACHR.org/countryrep/Guatemala83eng/intro.htm. 10 Annex 1. CEH, Memory of Silence, Volume V, Conclusions and Recommendations, par. 119.